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Abstract
We give polynomial time algorithms for deciding almost-sure and limit-sure reachability in
Branching Concurrent Stochastic Games (BCSGs). These are a class of infinite-state imperfect-
information stochastic games that generalize both finite-state concurrent stochastic reachability
games ([1]), as well as branching simple stochastic reachability games ([16]).
1 Introduction
Branching Processes (BP) are infinite-state stochastic processes that model the stochastic evolution
of a population of entities of distinct types. In each generation, every entity of each type t produces
a set of entities of various types in the next generation according to a given probability distribution
on offsprings for the type t. BPs are fundamental stochastic models that have been used to model
phenomena in many fields, including biology (see, e.g., [28]), population genetics ([23]), physics
and chemistry (e.g., particle systems, chemical chain reactions), medicine (e.g. cancer growth
[2, 33]), marketing, and others. In many cases, the process is not purely stochastic but there
is the possibility of taking actions (for example, adjusting the conditions of reactions, applying
drug treatments in medicine, advertising in marketing, etc.) which can influence the probabilistic
evolution of the process to bias it towards achieving desirable objectives. Some of the factors that
affect the reproduction may be controllable (to some extent) while others are not and also may
not be sufficiently well-understood to be modeled accurately by specific probability distributions,
and thus it may be more appropriate to consider their effect in an adversarial (worst-case) sense.
Branching Concurrent Stochastic Games (BCSG) are a natural model to represent such settings.
There are two players, who have a set of available actions for each type t that affect the reproduction
for this type; for each entity of type t in the evolution of the process, the two players select
concurrently an action from their available set (possibly in a randomized manner) and their choice
of actions determines the probability distribution for the offspring of the entity. The first player
represents the controller that can control some of the parameters of the reproduction and the
second player represents other parameters that are not controlled and are treated adversarially.
The first player wants to select a strategy that optimizes some objective. In this paper we focus
on reachability objectives, a basic and natural class of objectives. Some types are designated as
undesirable (for example, malignant cells), in which case we want to minimize the probability of
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ever reaching any entity of such type. Or conversely, some types may be designated as desirable,
in which case we want to maximize the probability of reaching an entity of such a type.
BCSGs generalize the purely stochastic Branching Processes as well as Branching Markov De-
cision Processes (BMDP) and Branching Simple Stochastic Games (BSSG) which were studied
for reachability objectives in [16]. In BMDPs there is only one player who aims to maximize or
minimize a reachability objective. In BSSGs there are two opposing players but they control dif-
ferent types. These models were studied previously also under another basic objective, namely the
optimization of extinction probability, i.e., the probability that the process will eventually become
extinct, that is, that the population will become empty [15, 18]. We will later discuss in detail the
prior results in these models and compare them with the results in this paper.
BCSGs can also be seen as a generalization of finite-state concurrent games [1] (see also [21]),
namely the extension of such finite games with branching. Concurrent games have been used in the
verification area to model the dynamics of open systems, where one player represents the system and
the other player the environment. Such a system moves sequentially from state to state depending
on the actions of the two players (the system and the environment). Branching concurrent games
model the more general setting in which processes can spawn new processes that proceed then
independently in parallel (e.g.. new threads are created and terminated). We note incidentally that
even if there are no probabilities in the system itself, in the case of concurrent games, probabilities
arise naturally from the fact that the optimal strategies are in general randomized; as a consequence
it can be shown that branching concurrent stochastic games are expressively and computationally
equivalent to the non-stochastic version (see [18]).
We now summarize our main results and compare and contrast them with previous results on
related models. First, we show that a Branching concurrent stochastic game G with a reachability
objective has a well-defined value, i.e., given an initial (finite) population µ of entities of various
types and a target type t∗, if the sets of (mixed) strategies of the two players are respectively
Ψ1, Ψ2, and if Υσ,τ (µ, t
∗) denotes the probability of reaching eventually an entity of type t∗ when
starting from population µ under strategy σ ∈ Ψ1 for player 1 and strategy τ ∈ Ψ2 for player 2,
then infσ∈Ψ1 supτ∈Ψ2 Υσ,τ (µ, t
∗) = supτ∈Ψ2 infσ∈Ψ1 Υσ,τ (µ, t
∗), which is the value v∗ of the game.
Furthermore, we show that the player who wants to minimize the reachability probability always
has an optimal (mixed) static strategy that achieves the value, i.e., a strategy σ∗ which uses for
all entities of each type t generated over the whole history of the game the same probability
distribution on the available actions, independent of the past history, and which has the property
that v∗ = supτ∈Ψ2 Υσ∗,τ (µ, t
∗). The optimal strategy in general has to be mixed (randomized);
this was known to be the case even for finite-state concurrent games [1]. On the other hand, the
player that wants to maximize the reachability probability of a BCSG may not have an optimal
strategy (whether static or not), and it was known that this holds even for BMDPs, i.e., even when
there is only one player [16]. This also holds for finite-state CSGs: the player aiming to maximize
reachability probability does not necessarily have any optimal strategy [1].
To analyze BCSGs with respect to reachability objectives, we model them by a system of
equations x = P (x), called a minimax Probabilistic Polynomial System (minimax-PPS for short),
where x is a tuple of variables corresponding to the types of the BCSG. There is one equation
xi = Pi(x) for each type ti, where Pi(x) is the value of a (one-shot) two-player zero-sum matrix
game, whose payoff for every pair of actions is given by a polynomial in x whose coefficients are
positive and sum to at most 1 (a probabilistic polynomial). The function P (x) defines a monotone
operator from [0, 1]n to itself, and thus it has, in particular, a greatest fixed point (GFP) g∗ in
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[0, 1]n. We show that the coordinates g∗i of the GFP give the optimal non-reachability probabilities
for the BCSG game when started with a population that consists of a single entity of type ti.
The value of the game for any initial population µ can be derived easily from the GFP g∗ of the
minimax-PPS. This generalizes a result in [16], which established an analogous result for the special
case of BSSGs. It also follows from our minimax-PPS equational characterization that quantitative
decision problems for BCSGs, such as deciding whether the reachability game value is ≥ p for a
given p ∈ (0, 1) are all solvable in PSPACE.
Our main algorithmic results concern the qualitative analysis of the reachability problem, that
is, the problem of determining whether one of the players can win the game with probability 1, i.e.,
if the value of the game is 0 or 1. We provide the first polynomial-time algorithms for qualitative
reachability analysis for branching concurrent stochastic games. For the value=0 problem, the
algorithm and its analysis are rather simple. If the value is 0, the algorithm computes an optimal
strategy σ∗ for the player that wants to minimize the reachability probability; the constructed
strategy σ∗ is in fact static and deterministic, i.e., it selects for each type deterministically a single
available action, and guarantees Υσ∗,τ (µ, t
∗) = 0 for all τ ∈ Ψ2. If the value is positive then the
algorithm computes a static mixed strategy τ for the player maximizing reachability probability
that guarantees infσ∈Ψ1 Υσ,τ (µ, t∗) > 0.
The value=1 problem is much more complicated. There are two versions of the value=1 problem,
because it is possible that the value of the game is 1 but there is no strategy for the maximizing
player that guarantees reachability with probability 1. The critical reason for this is the concurrency
in the moves of the two players: for BMDPs and BSSGs, it is known that if the value is 1 then there
is a strategy τ that achieves it [16];1 on the other hand, this is not the case even for finite-state
concurrent games [1]. Thus, we have two versions of the problem. In the first version, called the
almost-sure problem, we want to determine whether there exists a strategy τ∗ for player 2 that
guarantees that the target type t∗ is reached with probability 1 regardless of the strategy of player
1, i.e., such that Υσ,τ∗(µ, t
∗) = 1 for all σ ∈ Ψ1. In the second version of the problem, called the
limit-sure problem, we want to determine if the value v∗ = supτ∈Ψ2 infσ∈Ψ1 Υσ,τ (µ, t
∗) is 1, i.e., if
for every  > 0 there is a strategy τ of player 2 that guarantees that the probability of reaching
the target type is at least 1−  regardless of the strategy σ of player 1; such a strategy τ is called
−optimal. The main result of the paper is to provide polynomial-time algorithms for both versions
of the problem. The algorithms are nontrivial, building upon the algorithms of both [1] and [16]
which both address different special subcases of qualitative BCSG reachability.
In the almost-sure problem, if the answer is positive, our algorithm constructs (a compact
description of) a strategy τ∗ of player 2 that achieves value 1; the strategy is a randomized non-
static strategy, and this is inherent (i.e., there may not exist a static strategy that achieves value
1). If the answer is negative, then our algorithm constructs a (non-static, randomized) strategy σ
for the opposing player 1 such that Υσ,τ (µ, t
∗) < 1 for all strategies τ of player 2. In the limit-
sure problem, if the answer is positive, i.e., the value is 1, our algorithm constructs for any given
 > 0, a static, randomized -optimal strategy, i.e., a strategy τ such that Υσ,τ(µ, t
∗) ≥ 1 − 
for all σ ∈ Ψ1. If the answer is negative, i.e., the value is < 1, our algorithm constructs a static
randomized strategy σ′ for player 1 such that supτ∈Ψ2 Υσ′,τ < 1.
Related Work. As mentioned, the two works most closely related to ours are [1] and [16].
Our results generalize both. Firstly, de Alfaro, Henzinger, and Kupferman [1] studied finite-state
1When the value is positive and not equal to 1, even for BMDPs there need not exist an optimal strategy for the
player maximizing reachability probability [16].
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concurrent (stochastic) games (CSGs) with reachability objectives and provided polynomial time
algorithms for their qualitative analysis, both for the almost-sure and the limit-sure reachability
problem (see also [25, 22, 24, 7] for more recent results on finite-state CSG reachability). Branch-
ing Markov Decision Processes (BMDPs) and Branching Simple Stochastic Games (BSSGs) with
reachability objectives were studied in [16], which provided polynomial-time algorithms for their
qualitative analysis. The paper [16] also gave polynomial time algorithms for the approximate
quantitative analysis of BMDPs, i.e., for the approximate computation of the optimal reachability
probability for maximizing and minimizing BMDPs, and showed that this problem for BSSGs is in
TFNP. Note that even for finite-state simple stochastic games the question of whether the value of
the game can be computed in polynomial time is a well-known long-standing open problem [9]. It
was also shown in [16] that the optimal non-reachability probabilities of maximizing or minimizing
BMDPs and BSSGs were captured by the greatest fixed point of a system of equations x = P (x),
where the right-hand side Pi(x) of each equation is the maximum or minimum of a set of probabilis-
tic polynomials in x; note that these types of equation systems are special cases of minimax-PPS,
and correspond to the case where in each one-shot game on the rhs of the minimax-PPS equations
only one of the two players has a choice of actions.
The quantitative problem for finite-state concurrent games, i.e., computing or approximating the
value v∗ of the game (the optimal reachability probability), has been studied previously and seems
to be considerably harder than the qualitative problem. The problem of determining if the value v∗
exceeds a given rational number, for example 1/2, is at least as hard as the long-standing square-
root sum problem ([18]), a well-known open problem in numerical computation, which is currently
not known whether it is in NP or even in the polynomial hierarchy. The problem of approximating
the value v∗ within a given desired precision can be solved however in the polynomial hierarchy,
specifically in TFNP[NP] [22]. It is open whether the approximation problem is in NP (or moreover
in P). It was shown in [24] that the standard algorithms for (approximately) solving these games,
value iteration and policy iteration, can be extremely slow in the worst-case: they can take a doubly
exponential number of iterations to obtain any nontrivial approximation, even when the value v∗ is
1. Note also that there are finite-state CSGs, with reachability value= 1, for which (near-)optimal
strategies for minimizer (maximizer, respectively) need to have some action probabilities that are
doubly-exponentially small [25, 7]; thus a fixed point representation of the probabilities would
need an exponential number of bits, and one must use a suitable compact representation to ensure
polynomial space. This is of course the case also for branching stochastic games; the optimal or -
optimal strategies constructed by our algorithms may use double-exponentially small probabilities,
which can however be represented succinctly so that the algorithms run in polynomial time.
Another important objective, the probability of extinction, has been studied previously for
Branching Concurrent Stochastic Games, as well as BMDPs and BSSGs, and the purely stochastic
model of Branching Processes (BPs). These branching models under the extinction objective are
equivalent to corresponding subclasses of recursive Markov models, called respectively, 1-exit Recur-
sive Concurrent Stochastic Games (1-RCSG), Markov Decision Processes (1-RMDP), and Markov
Chains (1-RMC), and related subclasses of probabilistic pushdown processes under a termination
objective [20, 14, 19, 15, 18, 13]. The extinction probabilities for these models are captured by
the least fixed point (LFP) solutions of similar systems of probabilistic polynomial equations; for
example, the optimal extinction probabilities of a BCSG are given by the LFP of a minimax-PPS.
Polynomial time-algorithms for qualitative analysis, as well as for the approximate computation
of the optimal extinction probabilities of Branching MDPs (and 1-RMDPs) were given in [19, 15].
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However, negative results were shown also which indicate that the problem is much harder for
branching concurrent (or even simple) stochastic games, even for the qualitative extinction prob-
lem. Specifically, it was shown in [19] that the qualitative extinction (termination) problem for
BSSG (equivalently, 1-RSSG) is at least as hard as the well-known open problem of computing the
value of a finite-state simple stochastic game [9]. Furthermore, it was shown in [18] that (both the
almost-sure and limit-sure) qualitative extinction problems for BCSGs (equivalently 1-RCSGs) are
at least as hard as the square-root sum problem, which is not even known to be in NP.2 Thus, the
extinction problem for BCSGs seems to be very different than the reachability problem for BCSGs:
obtaining analogous results for the extinction problem of BCSGs to those of the present paper for
reachability would resolve two major open problems.
The equivalence between branching models (like e.g. BPs, BMDPs, BCSGs) and recursive
Markov models (like 1-RMC, 1-RMDP, 1-RCSG) with respect to extinction does not hold for the
reachability objective. For example, almost-sure and limit-sure reachability coincide for a BMDP,
i.e., if the supremum probability of reaching the target is 1 then there exists a strategy that ensures
reachability with probability 1. However, this is not the case for 1-RMDPs. Furthermore, it is
known that almost-sure reachability for 1-RMDPs can be decided in polynomial time [5, 4], but
limit-sure reachability for 1-RMDPs is not even known to be decidable. The qualitative reachability
problem for 1-RMDPs and 1-RSSGs (and equivalent probabilistic pushdown models) was studied in
[4, 3]. These results do not apply to the corresponding branching models (BMDP, BSSG). Another
objective considered in prior work is the expected total reward objective for 1-RSSGs and ([17]) and
1-RCSGs ([37]) with positive rewards. In particular, [37] shows that the “qualitative” problem of
determining whether the game value for a 1-RCSG total reward game is =∞ is in PSPACE. None
of these prior results have any implications for BCSGs with reachability objectives.
For richer objectives beyond reachability or extinction, Chen et. al. [8] studied model checking
of purely stochastic branching processes (BPs) with respect to properties expressed by deterministic
parity tree automata, and showed that the qualitative problem is in P-time (hence this holds in
particular for reachability probability in BPs), and that the quantitative problem of comparing the
probability with a rational is in PSPACE. Michalevski and Mio [30] extended this to properties of
BPs expressed by “game automata”, a subclass of alternating parity tree automata. More recently,
Przyby lko and Skrzypczak [32] considered existence and complexity of game values of Branching
turn-based (i.e., simple) stochastic games, with regular objectives, where the two players aim to
maximize/minimize the probability that the generated labeled tree belongs to a regular language
(given by a tree automaton). They showed that (unlike our case of simpler reachability games)
already for some basic regular properties these games are not even determined, meaning they do
not have a value. They furthermore showed that for a probabilistic turn-based branching game,
with a regular tree objective, it is undecidable to compare the value that a given player can force
to 1/2; whereas for deterministic turn-based branching games they showed it is decidable and
2-EXPTIME-complete (respectively, EXPTIME-complete), to determine whether the player aiming
2The results in [18] were phrased in terms of the limit-sure problem, where it was shown that (a) deciding whether
the value of a finite-state CSG reachability game is at least a given value p ∈ (0, 1) is square-root-sum-hard, and (b)
that the former problem is reducible to the limit-sure decision problem for BCSG extinction games. But the hardness
proofs of (b) and (a) in [18] apply mutatis mutandis to (b) the almost-sure problem for BCSG extinction, and to
(a) the corresponding problem of deciding, given a finite-state CSG and a value p ∈ (0, 1), whether the maximizing
player has a strategy that achieves at least value p, regardless of the strategy of the minimizer. Thus, both the
almost-sure and limit-sure extinction problem for BCSGs are square-root-sum hard, and also both are at least as
hard as Condon’s problem of computing the exact value of a finite-state SSG reachability game.
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to satisfy (respectively, falsify) a given regular tree objective has a pure winning strategy. Other
past research includes work in operations research on (one-player) Branching MDPs [31, 35, 11].
None of these prior works bear on any of the results on BCSG reachability problems established in
this paper.
On the complexity of quantitative problems for BCSGs.
All quantitative decision and approximation problems for BCSG extinction and reachability
games are in PSPACE. This follows by exploiting the minimax-PPS equations whose least (and
greatest) fixed point solution captures the extinction (and non-reachability) values of these games,
and by then appealing to PSPACE upper bounds for deciding the existential (and bounded-
alternation) theory of reals ([34]), in order to decide questions about, and to approximate, the
LFP and GFP of such equations. This was shown already for BCSG extinction games in [18]. A
directly analogous proof yields the same PSPACE upper bound for BCSG reachability games. As
mentioned before, the corresponding decision problems (e.g., deciding whether the BCSG game
value is at least a given probability p ∈ (0, 1)), are square-root-sum-hard, already for finite-state
CSG reachability games [18] (which are subsumed by both BCSG extinction and BCSG reachability
games). This implies that even placing these decision problems in the polynomial time hierarchy
would require a breakthrough. An interesting question is how much the PSPACE upper bounds
can be improved for the approximation problems. As noted earlier, Frederiksen and Miltersen [22]
have shown that for finite-state CSG reachability games, the game value can be approximated to
desired precision in TFNP[NP]. We do not know an analogous complexity result for quantitative
approximation problems for BCSG extinction or reachability games, nor do we know square-root-
sum-hardness for these approximation problems. We leave these as interesting open questions.
Organization of the paper.
Section 2 gives background and basic definitions. Section 3 shows the relationship between the
optimal non-reachability probabilities of a game and the greatest fixed point of a minimax-PPS.
Section 4 presents the algorithm for determining if the value of a game is 0. Section 5 presents the
algorithm for almost-sure reachability, and Section 6 for limit-sure reachability.
2 Background
This section introduces some definitions and background for Branching Concurrent Stochastic
Games. It builds directly on, and generalizes, the definitions in [16] associated with reachabil-
ity problems for Branching MDPs and Branching Simple Stochastic Games.
We first define the general model of a (multi-type) Branching Concurrent Stochastic Games(BCSGs),
as well as some important restrictions of the general model: Branching Simple Stochastic Games
(BSSGs), Branching MDPs (BMDPs), and (multi-type) Branching Processes (BPs).
Definition 1. A Branching Concurrent Stochastic Game(BCSG) is a 2-player zero-sum
game that consists of a finite set V = {T1, . . . Tn} of types, two finite non-empty sets Γimax,Γimin ⊆ Σ
of actions (one for each player) for each type Ti (Σ is a finite action alphabet), and a finite set
R(Ti, amax, amin) of probabilistic rules associated with each tuple (Ti, amax, amin), i ∈ [n], where
amax ∈ Γimax and amin ∈ Γimin. Each rule r ∈ R(Ti, amax, amin) is a triple (Ti, pr, αr), which
we can denote by Ti
pr−→ αr, where αr ∈ Nn is a n-vector of natural numbers that denotes a
finite multi-set over the set V , and where pr ∈ (0, 1] ∩ Q is the probability of the rule r (which
we assume to be a rational number, for computational purposes), where we assume that for all
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Ti ∈ V and amax ∈ Γimax, amin ∈ Γimin, the rule probabilities in R(Ti, amax, amin) sum to 1, i.e.,∑
r∈R(Ti,amax,amin) pr = 1.
If for all types Ti ∈ V , either |Γimax| = 1 or |Γimin| = 1, then the model is a “turn-based”
perfect-information game and is called a Branching Simple Stochastic Game (BSSG). If for
all Ti ∈ V , |Γimax| = 1 (respectively, |Γimin| = 1), then it is called a minimizing Branching Markov
Decision Process (BMDP) (respectively, a maximizing BMDP). If both |Γimin| = 1 = |Γimax| for
all i ∈ [n], then the process is a classic, purely stochastic, multi-type Branching Process (BP)
([26]).
A play of a BCSG defines a (possibly infinite) node-labeled forest, whose nodes are labeled by
the type of the object they represent. A play contains a sequence of “generations”, X0, X1, X2, . . .
(one for each integer time t ≥ 0, corresponding to nodes at depth/level t in the forest). For
each t ∈ N, Xt consists of the population (set of objects of given types), at time t. X0 is the
initial population at generation 0 (these are the roots of the forest). Xk+1 is obtained from Xk
in the following way: for each object e in the set Xk, assuming e has type Ti, both players select
simultaneously and independently actions amax ∈ Γimax, and amin ∈ Γimin (or distributions on such
actions), according to their strategies; thereafter a rule r ∈ R(Ti, amax, amin) is chosen randomly
and independently (for object e) with probability pr; each such object e in Xk is then replaced by
the set of objects specified by the multi-set αr associated with the corresponding randomly chosen
rule r. This process is repeated in each generation, as long as the current generation is not empty,
and if for some k ≥ 0, Xk = ∅ then we say the process terminates or becomes extinct.
The strategies of the players can in general be arbitrary. Specifically, at each generation, k,
each player can, in principle, select actions for the objects in Xk based on the entire past history,
may use randomization (a mixed strategy), and may make different choices for objects of the same
type. The history of the process up to time k − 1 is a forest of depth k − 1 that includes not only
the populations X0, X1, . . . , Xk−1, but also the information regarding all the past actions and rules
applied and the parent-child relationships between all the objects up to the generation of k − 1.
The history can be represented by a forest of depth k − 1, with internal nodes labelled by rules
and actions, and whose leaves at level k − 1 form the population Xk−1. Thus, a strategy of player
1 (player 2, respectively) is a function that maps every finite history (i.e., labelled forest of some
finite depth as above) to a function that maps each object e in the current population Xk (assuming
that the history has depth k) to a probability distribution on the actions Γimax (to the actions Γ
i
min,
respectively), assuming that object e has type Ti.
Let Ψ1,Ψ2 be the set of all strategies of players 1, 2. We say that a strategy is deterministic if
for every history it maps each object e in the current population to a single action with probability
1 (in other words, it does not randomize on actions). We say that a strategy is static if for each
type Ti ∈ V , and for any object e of type Ti, the player always chooses the same distribution on
actions, irrespective of the history.
Different objectives can be considered for the BCSG game model. The extinction (or termina-
tion) objective, where players aim to maximize/minimize the extinction probability, has already
been studied in detail in [19] for BSSGs and in [18] for BCSGs3. In particular, in [18] it was shown
that the player minimizing extinction probability for BCSGs always has an optimal (randomized)
3Strictly speaking, the model studied in [18] is 1-exit Recursive concurrent stochastic games (1-RCSGs) with the
objective of termination, but such games are easily seen to be equivalent to BCSGs with the extinction objective:
there is a simple linear-time transformation from a 1-RCSG termination game to a BCSG extinction game, and vice
versa (see [20] for the same correspondence, in the purely stochastic setting).
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static strategy, whereas the player maximizing extinction probability in general may only have
-optimal randomized static strategies, for all  > 0. (For BSSGs, it was shown in [19] that both
players have optimal deterministic static strategies for optimizing extinction probability.)
This paper, on the other hand, deals with the (existential) reachability objective for BCSGs,
where the aim of the players is to maximize/minimize the probability of reaching a generation that
contains at least one object of a given target type Tf∗ . This objective was previously studied in [16],
but only for BMDPs and BSSGs, not for the more general model of BCSGs. It was already shown
in [16] that in a BSSG the player minimizing reachability probability always has a deterministic
static optimal strategy, whereas (unlike for the extinction objective) in general there need not exist
any optimal strategy for the player maximizing reachability probability in a BMDP (and hence also
in a BSSG and BCSG). On the other hand, it was shown in [16] that for BMDPs and BSSGs, if the
reachability game value is = 1, then there is in fact an optimal strategy (but not in general a static
one, even when randomization is allowed) for the player maximizing the reachability probability that
forces the value 1 (irrespective of the strategy of the player minimizing the reachability probability).
It was also shown that deciding whether the value = 1 for BSSG reachability game can be decided
in P-time, and if the answer is “yes” then an optimal (non-static, but deterministic) strategy that
achieves reachability value 1 for the maximizer can be computed in P-time, whereas if the answer
is “no” a deterministic static strategy that forces value < 1 can be computed for the minimizer in
P-time.
We will show in this paper that the reachability game also has a value for the more gen-
eral imperfect-information game class of BCSGs. We do so by establishing systems of nonlinear
minimax-equations whose greatest fixed point gives the vector of values of the non-reachability
game.
Let us note right away that there is a natural “duality” between the objectives of optimizing
reachability probability and that of optimizing extinction probability for BCSGs. This duality
was previously detailed in [16] for BSSGs. The objective of optimizing the extinction probability
(i.e., the probability of generating a finite tree), starting from a given type, can equivalently be
rephrased as a “universal reachability” objective (on a slightly modified BCSG), where the goal is
to optimize the probability of eventually reaching the target type (namely “death”) on all paths
starting at the root of the tree. Likewise, the “universal reachability” objective can equivalently
be rephrased as the objective of optimizing extinction probability (on a slightly modified BCSG).
By contrast, the reachability objective that we study in this paper is the “existential reachability”
objective of optimizing the probability of reaching the target type on some path in the generated
tree. Despite this natural duality between these two objectives, we show that there is a wide
disparity between them, both in terms of the nature and existence of optimal strategies, and in
terms of computational complexity: we show that the qualitative (existential) reachability problem
for BCSGs can be solved in polynomial time, both in the almost-sure and limit-sure sense.
The BCSG reachability game can of course also be viewed as a “non-reachability” game (by
just reversing the role of the players). It turns out this is useful to do, and we will exploit it in
crucial ways (and this was also exploited in [16] for BMDPs and BSSGs). So we provide some
notation for this purpose. Given an initial population µ ∈ Nn, with µf∗ = 0, and given an integer
k ≥ 0, and strategies σ ∈ Ψ1, τ ∈ Ψ2, let gkσ,τ (µ) be the probability that the process does not
reach a generation with an object of type Tf∗ in at most k steps, under strategies σ, τ and starting
from the initial population µ. To be more formal, this is the probability that (Xl)f∗ = 0 for all
0 ≤ l ≤ k. Similarly, let g∗σ,τ (µ) be the probability that (Xl)f∗ = 0 for all l ≥ 0. We define
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gk(µ) = supσ∈Ψ1 infτ∈Ψ2 g
k
σ,τ (µ) to be the value of the k-step non-reachability game for the initial
population µ, and g∗(µ) = supσ∈Ψ1 infτ∈Ψ2 g
∗
σ,τ (µ) to be the value of the game under the non-
reachability objective and for the initial population µ. The next section will demonstrate that
these games are determined, meaning they have a value where g∗(µ) = supσ∈Ψ1 infτ∈Ψ2 g
∗
σ,τ (µ) =
infτ∈Ψ2 supσ∈Ψ1 g
∗
σ,τ (µ). Similarly, for g
k(µ).
In the case where the initial population µ is a single object of some given type Ti, then for
the value of the game we write g∗i (or similarly, g
k
i , and when strategy σ and τ are fixed, we write
(g∗σ,τ )i). The collection of these values, namely the vector g∗ of g∗i ’s, is called the vector of the non-
reachability values of the game. We will see that, having the vector of g∗i ’s, the non-reachability
value for a starting population µ can be computed simply as g∗(µ) = f(g∗, µ) :=
∏
i(g
∗
i )
µi . So given
a BCSG, the aim is to compute the vector of non-reachability values. As our original objective
is reachability, we point out that the vector of reachability values is r∗ = 1 − g∗ (where 1 is the
all-1 vector), and hence the reachability value r∗(µ) of the game starting with population µ is
r∗(µ) = 1− g∗(µ).
We will associate with any given BCSG a system of minimax probabilistic polynomial equations
(minimax-PPS), x = P (x), for the non-reachability objective. This system will be constructed to
have one variable xi and one equation xi = Pi(x) for each type Ti other than the target type Tf∗ .
We will show that the vector of non-reachability values g∗ for different starting types is precisely
the Greatest Fixed Point(GFP) solution of the system x = P (x) in [0, 1]n.
In order to define these systems of equations, some shorthand notation will be useful. We use xv
to denote the monomial xv11 ∗xv22 · · · ∗xvnn for an n-vector of variables x = (x1, · · · , xn) and a vector
v ∈ Nn. Considering a multi-variate polynomial Pi(x) =
∑
r∈R prx
αr for some rational coefficients
pr, r ∈ R, we will call Pi(x) a probabilistic polynomial, if pr ≥ 0 for all r ∈ R and
∑
r∈R pr ≤ 1.
Definition 2. A probabilistic polynomial system of equations (PPS), x = P (x), is a system
of n equations, xi = Pi(x), in n variables where for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, Pi(x) is a probabilistic
polynomial.
A minimax probabilistic polynomial system of equations (minimax-PPS), x = P (x),
is a system of n equations in n variables x = (x1, . . . , xn), where for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, Pi(x) :=
V al(Ai(x)) is an associated Minimax-probabilistic-polynomial. By this we mean that Pi(x) is
defined to be, for each x ∈ Rn, the minimax value of the two-player zero-sum matrix game given by
a finite game payoff matrix Ai(x) whose rows are indexed by the actions Γ
i
max, and whose columns
are indexed by the actions Γimin, where, for each pair amax ∈ Γimax and amin ∈ Γimin, the matrix
entry (Ai(x))amax,amin is given by a probabilistic polynomial qi,amax,amin(x). Thus, if ni = |Γimax|
and mi = |Γimin|, and if we assume w.l.o.g. that Γimax = {1, . . . , ni} and that Γimin = {1, . . . ,mi},
then V al(Ai(x)) is defined as the minimax value of the zero-sum matrix game, given by the following
payoff matrix:
Ai(x) =

qi,1,1(x) qi,1,2(x) . . . qi,1,mi(x)
qi,2,1(x) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
...
...
...
...
qi,ni,1(x) . . . . . . . . . . . . qi,ni,mi(x)

with each qi,j,k(x) :=
∑
r∈R(Ti,j,k) prx
αr being a probabilistic polynomial for the actions pair j, k.
If for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, either |Γimin| = 1 or |Γimax| = 1, then we call such a system min-max-
PPS. If for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, |Γimin| = 1 (respectively, if |Γimax| = 1 for all i) then we will call
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such a system a maxPPS (respectively, a minPPS). Finally, a PPS is a minimax-PPS with both
|Γimin| = 1 = |Γimax| for every i ∈ {1, · · · , n}.
For computational purposes, we assume that all coefficients are rational and that there are no
zero terms in the probabilistic polynomials, and we assume the coefficients and non-zero exponents
of each term are given in binary. We denote by |P | the total bit encoding length of a system
x = P (x) under this representation.
This paper will examine minimax-PPSs. Since P (x) defines a monotone function P : [0, 1]n →
[0, 1]n, it follows by Tarski’s theorem ([36])) that any such system has both a Least Fixed Point
(LFP) solution q∗ ∈ [0, 1]n, and a Greatest Fixed Point(GFP) solution, g∗ ∈ [0, 1]n. In other
words, q∗ = P (q∗) and g∗ = P (g∗) and moreover, for any s∗ ∈ [0, 1]n such that s∗ = P (s∗), we have
q∗ ≤ s∗ ≤ g∗ (coordinate-wise inequality).
We will show that the GFP of a minimax-PPS, g∗, corresponds to the vector of values for a
corresponding BCSG with non-reachability objective. We note that it has previously been shown
in [18] that the LFP solution, q∗ ∈ [0, 1]n of a minimax-PPS is the vector of extinction/termination
values for a corresponding (but different) BCSG with the extinction objective, and that the GFP
of a min-max-PPS is the vector of non-reachability values for a corresponding BSSG [16].
Definition 3. A (possibly randomized) policy for the max (min) player in a minimax-PPS, x =
P (x), is a function that assigns a probability distribution to each variable xi such that the support
of the distribution is a subset of Γimax (Γ
i
min, respectively), where these now denote the possible
actions(i.e., choices of rows and columns) available for the respective player in the game matrix
Ai(x) that defines Pi(x).
Intuitively, a policy is the same as a static strategy in the corresponding BCSG.
Definition 4. For a minimax-PPS, x = P (x), and policies σ and τ for the max and min players,
respectively, we write x = Pσ,τ (x) for the PPS obtained by fixing both these policies. We write
x = Pσ,∗(x) for the minPPS obtained by fixing σ for the max player, and x = P∗,τ (x) for the
maxPPS obtained by fixing τ for the min player. More specifically, for policy σ for the max player,
we define the minPPS, x = Pσ,∗(x), as follows: for all i ∈ [n], (Pσ,∗(x))i := min{sk : k ∈ Γimin},
where sk :=
∑
j∈Γimax σ(xi, j)∗qi,j,k(x), where σ(xi, j) is the probability that the fixed policy σ assigns
to action j ∈ Γimax in variable xi. We similarly define x = P∗,τ (x) and x = Pσ,τ (x).
For a minimax-PPS, x = P (x), and a (possibly randomized) policy, σ for the max player,
we use q∗σ,∗ and g∗σ,∗ to denote the LFP and GFP solution vectors of the corresponding minPPS,
x = Pσ,∗(x), respectively. Likewise we use q∗∗,τ and g∗∗,τ to denote the LFP and GFP solution vectors
of the maxPPS, x = P∗,τ (x).
Note: we overload notations such as (g∗σ,∗)i and (g∗∗,τ )i to mean slightly different things, de-
pending on whether σ and τ are as static strategies (policies), or are more general non-static
strategies. Specifically, let Ei ∈ Nn denote the unit vector which is 1 in the i’th coordinate and 0
elsewhere. When τ ∈ Ψ2 is a general non-static strategy we use the notation (g∗∗,τ )i := g∗∗,τ (Ei) =
supσ∈Ψ1 g
∗
σ,τ (Ei). We likewise define (g
∗
σ,∗)i. It will typically be clear from the context which
interpretation of (g∗∗,τ )i is intended.
Definition 5. For a minimax-PPS, x = P (x), a policy σ∗ is called optimal for the max player
for the LFP (respectively, the GFP) if q∗σ∗,∗ = q∗ (respectively, g∗σ∗,∗ = g∗).
An optimal policy τ∗ for the min player for the LFP and GFP, respectively, is defined similarly.
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For  > 0, a policy σ′ for the max player is called -optimal for the LFP (respectively, the
GFP), if ||q∗σ′,∗ − q∗||∞ ≤  (respectively, ||g∗σ′,∗ − g∗||∞ ≤ ). An -optimal policy τ ′ for the min
player is defined similarly.
For convenience in proofs throughout the paper and to simplify the structure of the matrices
involved in the minimax-probabilistic-polynomials, Pi(x), we shall observe that minimax-PPSs can
always be cast in the following normal form.
Definition 6. A minimax-PPS in simple normal form(SNF), x = P (x), is a system of n
equations in n variables {x1, · · · , xn}, where each Pi(x) for i = 1, 2, . . . , n is one of three forms:
• Form L: Pi(x) = ai,0 +
∑n
j=1 ai,jxj, where for all j, ai,j ≥ 0, and
∑n
j=0 ai,j ≤ 1
• Form Q: Pi(x) = xjxk for some j, k
• Form M: Pi(x) = V al(Ai(x)), where Ai(x) is a (ni×mi) matrix, such that for all amax ∈ [ni]
and amin ∈ [mi], the entry Ai(x)(amax,amin) ∈ {x1, . . . , xn} ∪ {1}.
(The reason we also allow “1” as an entry in the matrices Ai(x) will become clear later in
the context of our algorithm.)
We shall often assume a minimax-PPS in its SNF form, and say that a variable xi is “of
form/type” L, Q, or M, meaning that Pi(x) has the corresponding form. The following proposition
shows that we can efficiently convert any minimax-PPS into SNF form.
Proposition 2.1 (cf. [20, 14, 15]). Every minimax-PPS, x = P (x), can be transformed in P-time
to an “equivalent” minimax-PPS, y = Q(y) in SNF form, such that |Q| ∈ O(|P |). More precisely,
the variables x are a subset of the variables y, and both the LFP and GFP of x = P (x) are,
respectively, the projection of the LFP and GFP of y = Q(y), onto the variables x, and furthermore
an optimal policy (respectively, -optimal policy) for the LFP (respectively, GFP) of x = P (x) can
be obtained in P-time from an optimal (respectively, -optimal) policy for the LFP (respectively,
GFP) of y = Q(y).
Proof. We can easily convert, in P-time, any minimax-PPS into SNF form, using the following
procedure.
• For each equation xi = Pi(x) := V al(Ai(x)), for each probabilistic polynomial qi,j,k(x) on
the right-hand-side that is not a variable, add a new variable xd, replace qi,j,k(x) with xd in
Pi(x), and add the new equation xd = qi,j,k(x).
• For each equation xi = Pi(x) =
∑m
j=1 pjx
αj , where Pi(x) is a probabilistic polynomial that
is not just a constant or a single monomial, replace every (non-constant) monomial xαj on
the right-hand-side that is not a single variable by a new variable xij and add the equation
xij = x
αj .
• For each variable xi that occurs in some polynomial with exponent higher than 1, introduce
new variables xi1 , . . . , xik where k is the logarithm of the highest exponent of xi that occurs in
P (x), and add equations xi1 = x
2
i , xi2 = x
2
i1
, . . . , xik = x
2
ik−1 . For every occurrence of a higher
power xli, l > 1, of xi in P (x), if the binary representation of the exponent l is ak . . . a2a1a0,
then we replace xli by the product of the variables xij such that the corresponding bit aj is
1, and xi if a0 = 1. After we perform this replacement for all the higher powers of all the
variables, every polynomial of total degree >2 is just a product of variables.
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• If a polynomial Pi(x) = xj1 . . . xjm in the current system is the product of m > 2 variables,
then add m − 2 new variables xi1 , . . . , xim−2 , set Pi(x) = xj1xi1 , and add the equations
xi1 = xj2xi2 , xi2 = xj3xi3 , . . . , xim−2 = xjm−1xjm .
Now all equations are of the form L, Q, or M.
The above procedure allows us to convert any minimax-PPS into one in SNF form by introducing
O(|P |) new variables and blowing up the size of P by a constant factor O(1). It is clear that both
the LFP and the GFP of x = P (x) arise as the projections of the LFP and GFP of y = Q(y) onto
the x variables. Furthermore, there is an obvious (and easy to compute) bijection between policies
for the resulting SNF form minimax-PPS and the original minimax-PPS.
Thus from now on, and for the rest of this paper we may assume if needed, without loss of
generality, that all minimax-PPSs are in SNF normal form.
Definition 7. The dependency graph of a minimax-PPS, x = P (x), is a directed graph that has
one node for each variable xi, and contains an edge (xi, xj) if xj appears in Pi(x). The dependency
graph of a BCSG has one node for each type, and contains an edge (Ti, Tj) if there is a pair of
actions amax ∈ Γimax, amin ∈ Γimin and a rule Ti
pr−→ αr in R(Ti, amax, amin) such that Tj appears
in αr.
3 Non-reachability values for BCSGs and the Greatest Fixed Point
This section will show that for a given BCSG with a target type Tf∗ , a minimax-PPS, x = P (x),
can be constructed such that its Greatest Fixed Point(GFP) g∗ ∈ [0, 1]n is precisely the vector g∗
of non-reachability values for the BCSG.
For simplicity, from now on let us call a maximizer (respectively, a minimizer) the player that
aims to maximize(respectively, minimize) the probability of not reaching the target type. That is,
we swap the roles of the players for the benefit of less confusion in analysing the minimax-PPS.
While the players’ goals in the game are related to the objective of reachability, the equations we
construct will capture the optimal non-reachability values in the GFP of the minimax-PPS.
For each type Ti 6= Tf∗ , the minimax-PPS will have an associated variable xi and an equation
xi = Pi(x), and the Minimax-probabilistic-polynomial Pi(x) is built in the following way. For
each action amax ∈ Γimax of the maximizer (i.e., the player aiming to maximize the probability of not
reaching the target) and action amin ∈ Γimin of the minimizer in Ti, let R′(Ti, amax, amin) = {r ∈
R(Ti, amax, amin) | (αr)f∗ = 0} be the set of probabilistic rules r for type Ti and players’ action pair
(amax, amin) that generate a multi-set αr which does not contain an object of the target type. For
each actions pair for Ti, there is a probabilistic polynomial qi,amax,amin :=
∑
r∈R′(Ti,amax,amin) prx
αr .
Observe that there is no need to include rules where αr contains an item of type Tf∗ , because then
the term with monomial xαr will be 0. Now after a polynomial is constructed for each pair of
players’ moves, we construct Pi(x) as the value of a zero-sum matrix game Ai(x), where the matrix
is constructed as follows: (1) rows belong to the max player in the minimax-PPS (i.e., the player
trying to maximize the non-reachability probability), and columns belong to the min player; (2)
for each row and column (i.e., pair of actions (amax, amin)) there is a corresponding probabilistic
polynomial qi,amax,amin(x) in the matrix entry Ai(x)amax,amin .
The following theorem captures the fact that the optimal non-reachability values g∗ in the
BCSG correspond to the Greatest Fixed Point(GFP) of the minimax-PPS.
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Theorem 3.1. The non-reachability game values g∗ ∈ [0, 1]n of a BCSG reachability game exist,
and correspond to the Greatest Fixed Point(GFP) of the minimax-PPS, x = P (x), in [0, 1]n. That
is, g∗ = P (g∗), and for all other fixed points g′ = P (g′) in [0, 1]n, it holds that g′ ≤ g∗. Moreover,
for an initial population µ, the optimal non-reachability value is g∗(µ) =
∏
i(g
∗
i )
µi and the game
is determined, i.e., g∗(µ) = supσ∈Ψ1 infτ∈Ψ2 g
∗
σ,τ (µ) = infτ∈Ψ2 supσ∈Ψ1 g
∗
σ,τ (µ). Finally, the player
maximizing non-reachability probability in the BCSG has a (mixed) static optimal strategy.
Proof. Note that P : [0, 1]n → [0, 1]n is a monotone operator, since all coefficients in all the
polynomials Pi(x) are non-negative, and for x ≤ y, where x, y ∈ [0, 1]n, it holds that Ai(x) ≤ Ai(y)
(entry-wise inequality) and thus V al(Ai(x)) ≤ V al(Ai(y)). Thus, Pi(x) ≤ Pi(y). Let x0 = 1 and
xk = P (xk−1) = P k(1), k > 0 be the k-fold application of P on the vector 1 (i.e., the all-1 vector).
By induction on k the sequence xk is monotonically non-increasing, i.e., xk+1 ≤ xk ≤ 1.
By Tarski’s theorem ([36]), P (·) has a Greatest Fixed Point (GFP) x∗ ∈ [0, 1]n. The GFP is
the limit of the monotone the sequence xk, i.e., x∗ = limk→∞ xk. To continue the proof, we need
the following lemma.
Lemma 3.2. For any initial non-empty population µ, assuming it does not contain the target type
Tf∗, and for any k ≥ 0, the value of not reaching Tf∗ in k steps is gk(µ) = f(xk, µ) :=
∏n
i=1(x
k
i )
(µ)i.
Also, there are strategies for the players, σk ∈ Ψ1 and τk ∈ Ψ2, that achieve this value, that is
gk(µ) = supσ∈Ψ1 g
k
σ,τk
(µ) = infτ∈Ψ2 gkσk,τ (µ).
Proof. Before we begin the proof, let us make a quick observation. For a fixed vector x ∈ Rn,
consider the zero-sum matrix game defined by the payoff matrix Ai(x) for player 1 (the row player).
Consider fixed mixed strategies si and ti for the row and column players in this matrix game. Thus,
si(amax) (ti(amin), respectively) defines the probability placed on action amax (on action amin,
respectively) in si (in ti, respectively). The expected payoff to player 1 (the maximizing player),
under these mixed strategies is:∑
amax∈Γi1,amin∈Γi2
si(amax)ti(amin)qi,amax,amin(x)
=
∑
amax,amin
[
si(amax)ti(amin)
∑
r∈R′(Ti,amax,amin)
prx
αr
]
=
∑
amax,amin
∑
r∈R′(Ti,amax,amin)
si(amax)ti(amin)prx
αr =
∑
r∈R′(Ti)
p′rx
αr (1)
where R′(Ti) is the set of all probabilistic rules for type Ti; the newly defined probability p′r of
a rule r is equal to si(amax) ∗ ti(amin) ∗ pr for the pair (amax, amin) for which the rule r is in
R′(Ti, amax, amin), and where αr is the population that rule r generates, meaning rule r is defined
by Ti
pr→ αr.
Now let us prove the Lemma by induction on k. For the basis step, clearly g0(µ) = 1, since
the initial population does not contain any objects of the target type. Moreover, x0 = 1 and so
f(1, µ) = 1.
For the inductive step, first we demonstrate that gk(µ) ≥ f(xk, µ). Consider a strategy σk :=
(sˆ, σk−1) for the max player (i.e., the player aiming to maximize the non-reachability probability),
constructed in the following way. For all i, and for every object of type Ti in the initial population
µ = X0, the max player chooses as a first step the minimax-optimal mixed strategy sˆi in the zero-
sum matrix game Ai(x
k−1) (which exists, due to the minimax theorem). The min player (player
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2), as part of its strategy, chooses some distributions on actions for all objects in the population X0
(independently of player 1), and then the rules are chosen according to the resulting probabilities,
forming the next generation X1 at time 1. Thereafter, the max player acts according to an optimal
(k − 1)-step strategy σk−1, starting from population X1 (σk−1 exists by the inductive assumption,
and we will indeed prove by induction that the thus defined k-step strategy σk is optimal in the
k-step game). Note that σk can be mixed, and can also be non-static since the action probabilities
can depend on the generation and history.
Now let τ be any strategy for the min player. In the first step, τ chooses some distributions
on actions for each object in X0 = µ. After the choices of σ
k and τ are made in the first step,
rules are picked probabilistically and the population X1 is generated. By the inductive assump-
tion, gk−1(X1) = f(xk−1, X1), i.e., the value of not reaching the target type in next k − 1 steps,
starting in population X1, is precisely f(x
k−1, X1). Therefore, the k-step probability of not reach-
ing the target, starting in µ, using strategies σk and τ , is gk
σk,τ
(µ) =
∑
X1
p(X1)g
k−1
σk−1,τ (X1) ≥∑
X1
p(X1)f(x
k−1, X1), where the sum is over all possible next-step populations X1, and in each
term f(xk−1, X1) is multiplied by the probability p(X1) of generating that particular population
X1. The reason for the inequality is because, by optimality of σ
k−1 for the max player in the
(k − 1)-step game, we know that gk−1
σk−1,τ (X1) ≥ gk−1(X1) = f(xk−1, X1).
The sum
∑
X1
p(X1)f(x
k−1, X1) can be rewritten as a product of |µ| terms, one for each object
in the initial population X0. Specifically, given X0, let LX0,X1 denote the set of all possible tuples
of rules (r1, . . . , r|X0|), which associate to each object ej in the population X0, a rule rj such that
if ej has type Ti, then rj ∈ R′(Ti) is a rule for type Ti, and furthermore such that if we apply
the rules (r1, . . . , r|X0|), they generate multisets α1, . . . , α|X0|, such that we obtain the population
X1 =
⋃
αi from them.
Then for X0 = µ, we can rewrite
∑
X1
p(X1)f(x
k−1, X1) as:
∑
X1
p(X1)f(x
k−1, X1) =
∑
X1
∑
(r1,...,r|X0|)∈LX0,X1
(
|µ|∏
j=1
p′rj ) · (
|µ|∏
j=1
f(xk−1, αrj ))
=
|µ|∏
j=1
∑
rj
p′rjf(x
k−1, αrj ) ,
where rj ranges over all rules that can be generated by the type of object ej , and p
′
rj is the prob-
ability of generating rule rj for object ej in the first step, under strategies σ
k and τ . αrj is the
population produced from ej under rule rj . Note that the term
∑
rj
p′rjf(x
k−1, αrj ) for an ob-
ject ej of type Ti has the same form as equation (1) above. This observation implies that, since
the mixed strategy sˆi is minimax-optimal in the zero-sum matrix game with matrix Ai(x
k−1),
the term
∑
rj
p′rjf(x
k−1, αrj ) corresponding to each object ej of type Ti is ≥ V al(Ai(xk−1)) =
Pi(x
k−1) = xki . Hence, for any strategy τ chosen the min player, starting with the objects
in µ = X0, the probability of not reaching the target type in next k steps under strategies
σk and τ is gk
σk,τ
(µ) ≥ ∏|µ|i=1 xki = f(xk, µ). Therefore, the k-step non-reachability value is
gk(µ) = supσ∈Ψ1 infτ∈Ψ2 g
k
σ,τ (µ) ≥ infτ∈Ψ2 gkσk,τ (µ) ≥ f(xk, µ).
Symmetrically we can prove the reverse inequality by using the other player as an argument.
That is, similarly let τk selects as a first step for each object of type Ti in the initial population
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µ = X0 the (mixed) optimal strategy in the corresponding zero-sum matrix game Ai(x
k−1) (exists
by the minimax theorem). Simultaneously and independently the max player chooses moves for the
objects, and then rules are picked in order to generate population X1. Afterwards, the min player
acts according to an optimal k − 1-step strategy τk−1 (which exists by the inductive hypothesis).
As before, gk(µ) can be written as a product of |µ| terms, where each term is ∑rj p′rjf(xk−1, αrj ).
Again, by the choice of τk, it follows that the term for each object ej of type Ti is at most
V al(Ai(x
k−1)) = Pi(xk−1) = xki . Thus, showing that supσ∈Ψ1 g
k
σ,τk
(µ) ≤ f(xk, µ), and gk(µ) ≤
f(xk, µ). So, at the end gk(µ) = supσ∈Ψ1 g
k
σ,τk
(µ) = infτ∈Ψ2 gkσk,τ (µ) = f(x
k, µ) =
∏n
i=1(x
k
i )
(µ)i .
Note that the constructed strategy σk (and τk) is thus optimal for the player maximizing (respec-
tively, minimizing), the probability of not reachability the target type in k steps. If the initial
population consists of a single object of type Ti 6= Tf∗ , then the Lemma states that gki = xki for all
k ≥ 0.
Now we continue the proof of Theorem 3.1. We show that the game is determined, i.e., g∗(µ) =
supσ∈Ψ1 infτ∈Ψ2 g
∗
σ,τ (µ) = infτ∈Ψ2 supσ∈Ψ1 g
∗
σ,τ (µ), and that the game value for the objective of
not reaching Tf∗ is precisely f(x
∗, µ), where x∗ = limk→∞ xk ∈ [0, 1]n is the GFP of the system
x = P (x), which exists by Tarski’s theorem. As a special case, if the initial population µ is just a
single object of type Ti 6= Tf∗ , we have g∗i = x∗i .
Since the sequence xk converges to x∗ monotonically from above (recall x0 = 1 and the sequence
is monotonically non-increasing), then f(xk, µ) converges to f(x∗, µ) from above, i.e., for any  > 0
there is a k() where f(x∗, µ) ≤ f(xk(), µ) < f(x∗, µ) + . By Lemma 3.2, the min player strategy
τk() (as described in the Lemma) achieves the k()-step value of the game, i.e., supσ∈Ψ1 g
k()
σ,τk()
(µ) =
f(xk(), µ) < f(x∗, µ) + . But for any strategy σ, g∗
σ,τk()
(µ) ≤ gk()
σ,τk()
(µ), since the more steps the
game takes, the lower the probability of non-reachability is. So it follows that supσ∈Ψ1 g
∗
σ,τk()
(µ) ≤
supσ∈Ψ1 g
k()
σ,τk()
(µ) < f(x∗, µ)+. And since it holds for every  > 0, then infτ∈Ψ2 supσ∈Ψ1 g
∗
σ,τ (µ) ≤
f(x∗, µ). Thus, by standard facts, g∗(µ) = supσ∈Ψ1 infτ∈Ψ2 g
∗
σ,τ (µ) ≤ infτ∈Ψ2 supσ∈Ψ1 g∗σ,τ (µ) ≤
f(x∗, µ).
To show the reverse inequality, namely g∗(µ) ≥ f(x∗, µ), let σ∗ be the (mixed) static strategy for
the max player (i.e., the player aiming to maximize the probability of not reaching the target type),
that for each object of type Ti always selects the (mixed) optimal strategy in the zero-sum matrix
game Ai(x
∗) (which exists by the minimax theorem). Fixing σ∗, the BCSG becomes a minimizing
BMDP and the minimax-PPS, x = P (x), becomes a minPPS, x = P ′(x) = Pσ∗,∗(x). In this new
system of equations, for every type Ti (i.e., variable xi), the function on the right-hand side changes
from Pi(x) = V al(Ai(x)) to P
′
i (x) = min{mb : b ∈ Γimin}, where mb :=
∑
j∈Γimax σ
∗(xi, j) ∗ qi,j,b(x).
Hence, P ′(x) ≤ P (x) for all x ∈ [0, 1]n. Thus, if we denote by yk, k ≥ 0 the vectors obtained from
the k-fold application of P ′(x) on the vector 1 (i.e., the all-1 vector), then yk ≤ xk for all k ≥ 0.
So it follows that y∗ ≤ x∗, with y∗ and x∗ being the GFP of x = P ′(x) and x = P (x), respectively.
But since the fixed strategy σ∗ is the optimal strategy for the max player with respect to vector
x∗ and achieves the value Pi(x∗) = V al(Ai(x∗)) for all variables, x∗ must also be a fixed point of
x = P ′(x) and hence x∗ = y∗.
Now consider any strategy τ for the min player in the minimizing BMDP. Recall that a mini-
mizing BMDP is a BCSG where in every type the max player has a single available action. Then
by the induction step in the proof of Lemma 3.2 it holds that for every k ≥ 0, starting in the initial
population µ, the probability of not reaching the target type Tf∗ in k steps under strategy τ is
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at least f(yk, µ). Hence, the infimum probability of not reaching the target type (in any number
of steps) is at least limk→∞ f(yk, µ) = f(y∗, µ) = f(x∗, µ). Therefore, infτ∈Ψ2 g∗σ∗,τ (µ) ≥ f(x∗, µ).
However, we know that g∗(µ) = supσ∈Ψ1 infτ∈Ψ2 g
∗
σ,τ (µ) ≥ infτ∈Ψ2 g∗σ∗,τ (µ), which shows the reverse
inequality.
We can deduce that g∗(µ) = supσ∈Ψ1 infτ∈Ψ2 g
∗
σ,τ (µ) = infτ∈Ψ2 supσ∈Ψ1 g
∗
σ,τ (µ) = f(x
∗, µ) =
infτ∈Ψ2 g∗σ∗,τ (µ) and σ∗ is an optimal (mixed) static strategy for the max player under the non-
reachability objective.
Note that the player minimizing the non-reachability probability need not have any optimal
strategy, even for a BMDP (see Example 3.2 in [16]).
Corollary 3.3. Given a BCSG reachability game, and a probability p ∈ (0, 1), deciding whether
the game value is ≥ p is in PSPACE.
The PSPACE upper bound follows from Theorem 3.1, by appealing to decision procedures for
the (existential) theory of reals to answer quantitative questions about the GFP of the corresponding
minimax-PPS equations. This is entirely analogous to very similar arguments in [18, 16, 20], so
we do not elaborate. Any substantial improvement on PSPACE for such quantitative decision
problems would require a major breakthrough on exact numerical computation, even for BPs or
BMDPs (see [20, 16, 18]).
4 P-time algorithm for deciding reachability value = 0 for BCSGs
In this section we show that there is a P-time algorithm for computing the variables xi with value
g∗i = 1 for the GFP in a given minimax-PPS, or in other words, for a given BCSG, deciding whether
the value for reaching the target type, starting with an object of a given type Ti, is 0. The algorithm
does not take into consideration the actual probabilities on the transitions in the game (i.e., the
coefficients of the polynomials), but rather depends only on the structure of the game (respectively,
the dependency graph structure of the minimax-PPS) and performs an AND-OR graph reachability
analysis. The algorithm is easy, and is very similar to the algorithm given for deciding g∗i = 1 for
BSSGs in [16].
Proposition 4.1. (cf. [16], Proposition 4.1) There is a P-time algorithm that given a BCSG
or equivalently a corresponding minimax-PPS, x = P (x), with n variables and GFP g∗ ∈ [0, 1]n,
and given i ∈ [n], decides whether g∗i = 1 or g∗i < 1. Equivalently, for a given BCSG with non-
reachability objective and a starting object of type Ti, it decides whether the non-reachability game
value is 1. In the case of g∗i = 1, the algorithm produces a deterministic policy (or deterministic
static strategy in the BCSG case) σ for the max player (maximizing non-reachability) that forces
g∗i = 1. Otherwise, if g
∗
i < 1, the algorithm produces a mixed policy τ (a mixed static strategy) for
the min player (minimizing non-reachability) that guarantees g∗i < 1.
Proof. Let W = {x1, . . . , xn} denote the set of all variables in the minimax-PPS, x = P (x).
Recall that the dependency graph of x = P (x) has a directed edge (xi, xj) iff variable xi depends
on variable xj , i.e., xj occurs in Pi(x). Let us call a variable xi deficient if Pi(x) is of form L
and Pi(1) < 1. Let Z ⊆ {x1, . . . , xn} be the set of deficient variables. The remaining variables
X = W − Z are partitioned, according to their SNF-form equations: X = L ∪Q ∪M .
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1. Initialize S := Z.
2. Repeat until no change has occurred:
(a) if there is a variable xi 6∈ S of form L or Q such that Pi(x) contains a variable already
in S, then add xi to S.
(b) if there is a variable xi 6∈ S of form M such that for every action amax ∈ Γimax, there
exists an action amin ∈ Γimin, such that Ai(x)(amax,amin) ∈ S, then add xi to S.
3. Output the set S¯ := W − S.
Figure 1: Simple P-time algorithm for computing the set of types with reachability value 0 in a
given BCSG, or equivalently the set of variables {xi | g∗i = 1} of the associated minimax-PPS.
Figure 1 gives the algorithm. The intuition behind it is as follows: notice that in 2.(b) no
matter what strategy the max player chooses in the particular variable (i.e., type in the game), the
min player can ensure with positive probability to end up in a successor variable that already is
bad for the max player. The resulting winning strategies for players’ corresponding winning sets
(it is irrelevant to define strategies in the losing nodes) are: (i) for xi ∈ S, the min player’s strategy
(mixed static) τ selects uniformly at random among the “witness” moves from step 2.(b), and (ii)
for xi ∈ S the max player’s strategy (deterministic static) σ chooses an action amax ∈ Γimax that
ensures staying within S no matter what the minimizer’s action (which must exist, otherwise xi
would have been added to S).
We need to prove that g∗i < 1 iff xi ∈ S. First, we show that xi ∈ S implies g∗i < 1. Assume
xi ∈ S (and therefore τ is defined). We analyse by induction, based on the time (iteration) in
which variable xi was added to S in the iterative algorithm. For the base case, if xi was added
at the initial step (i.e., xi ∈ Z), then g∗i ≤ Pi(1) < 1. For the induction step, if variable xi is
of type L or Q, then g∗i = Pi(g
∗) is a linear combination (with positive coefficients whose sum is
≤ 1) or a quadratic term, containing at least one variable xj that was already in S prior to xi, and
hence, by induction, g∗j < 1. Hence, g
∗
i < 1. If xi is of form M, then for ∀amax ∈ Γimax, ∃amin ∈
Γimin such that the corresponding variable x(amax,amin) ∈ S (i.e., g∗(amax,amin) < 1), and τ gives
positive probability to all such witnesses amin. So for any strategy σ that the maximizer picks,∑
amin,amax
σ(xi, amax)τ(xi, amin)g
∗
(amax,amin)
< 1. It follows that for any strategy σ, (g∗σ,τ )i < 1, or
in other words (g∗∗,τ )i < 1. Thus, g∗i ≤ (g∗∗,τ )i < 1.
Next, to show that if g∗i < 1 then xi ∈ S, we show the contrapositive. Assume xi ∈ S (and
therefore σ is defined). All variables of form L ∪Q depend only on variables in S (otherwise they
would have been added to S). Moreover, for every xi of type M, there is a maximizer action amax
such that, all variables in row amax of the matrix of Ai(x) are in S. If no such action exists, then xi
would have been added to S in step 2.(b). Let σ(xi) choose such an action amax deterministically
(i.e., with probability 1). In the dependency graph of the resulting minPPS, x = Pσ,∗(x), there are
no edges from S¯ to S: all variables of type L, Q, or M depend only on S¯ variables, otherwise they
would have been added to S. Moreover, S does not contain any deficient variables. So, Pi(1) = 1
for every xi ∈ S, and the all-1 vector is a fixed point for the subsystem of the minPPS, x = Pσ,∗(x)
induced by the variables S¯. In other words, (g∗σ,∗)i = 1 (thus g∗i = 1) for all xi ∈ S¯.
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5 P-time algorithm for almost-sure reachability for BCSGs
In this section the focus is on the qualitative almost-sure reachability problem, i.e., starting with
an object of type Ti, decide whether the reachability value is 1 and there exists an optimal strategy
to achieve this value for the player aiming to maximize the reachability probability. That is, the
algorithm presented here computes a set F of variables (types), such that for any xi ∈ F , starting
from one object of type Ti there is a strategy τ for the player aiming to reach the target type Tf∗ ,
such that no matter what the other player does, almost-surely an object of type Tf∗ will be reached.
We of course also wish to compute such a strategy if it exists. Before presenting the algorithm, we
give some preliminary results based on the results in [16].
Following the definitions introduced in ([16], Section 5), a linear degenerate (LD)-PPS is a PPS
where every polynomial Pi(x) is linear, containing no constant term (i.e., Pi(x) =
∑n
j=1 pijxj) and
where the coefficients pij sum to 1. Hence, a LD-PPS has for LFP (q
∗) and GFP (g∗) the all-0
and the all-1 vectors, respectively. Furthermore, a PPS that does not contain a linear degenerate
bottom strongly-connected component (i.e., a component in the dependency graph that is strongly
connected and has no edges going out of it), is called a linear degenerate free(LDF)-PPS. In other
words, a LDF-PPS is a PPS that satisfies the conditions of Lemma 5.1(ii) below. Given a minimax-
PPS x = P (x), a policy τ for the min player is called LDF if the resulting PPS for all max player
policies σ, namely x = Pσ,τ (x), is a LDF-PPS. Having introduced this, now we can reference some
known results from [16] and give a concurrent version (Lemma 5.4) of one of the Lemmas from [16].
Lemma 5.1 (cf. [16], Lemma 5.1). For any PPS, x = P (x), exactly one of the following two cases
holds:
(i) x = P (x) contains a linear degenerate bottom strongly-connected component (BSCC), S, i.e.,
xS = PS(xS) is a LD-PPS, and PS(xS) ≡ BSxS, for a stochastic matrix BS.
(ii) every variable xi either is, or depends (directly or indirectly) on, a variable xj where Pj(x)
has one of the following properties:
1. Pj(x) has a term of degree 2 or more,
2. Pj(x) has a non-zero constant term, i.e., Pj(0) > 0 or
3. Pj(1) < 1.
Lemma 5.2 (cf. [16], Lemma 5.2). If a PPS, x = P (x), has either GFP g∗ < 1, or LFP q∗ > 0,
then x = P(x) is a LDF-PPS.
Lemma 5.3 (cf. [16], Lemma 5.5). For any LDF-PPS, x = P (x), and y < 1, if P (y) ≤ y then
y ≥ q∗ and if P (y) ≥ y, then y ≤ q∗. In particular, if q∗ < 1, then q∗ is the only fixed-point q of
x = P (x) with q < 1.
Lemma 5.4 (cf. [16], Lemma 9.1). For a minimax-PPS, x = P (x), if the GFP g∗ < 1, then:
1. there exists a (mixed) LDF policy τ for the min player such that g∗∗,τ < 1.
2. for any LDF min player’s policy τ ′, it holds that g∗ ≤ q∗∗,τ ′.
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Proof. For the first point, recall that since g∗ < 1, the algorithm from the previous section will
return a mixed static strategy(policy) τ for the min player such that g∗∗,τ < 1. Thus for all max’s
strategies σ : g∗σ,τ ≤ suppi∈Ψ1 g∗pi,τ = g∗∗,τ < 1. By Lemma 5.2, all PPSs, x = Pσ,τ (x), are LDF,
which results in the policy τ being LDF as well.
Showing the second claim, let us fix any LDF policy τ ′ for the min player. Notice that g∗ =
P (g∗) = infpi P∗,pi(g∗) ≤ P∗,τ ′(g∗). In the resulting maxPPS, there exist a strategy σ for the max
player such that g∗ ≤ Pσ,τ ′(g∗) = P∗,τ ′(g∗). For every variable xi with g∗i = max{g∗1, . . . , g∗di} in
the maxPPS, the strategy itself chooses the successor in the dependency graph that maximizes g∗i .
Now using Lemma 5.3 with LDF-PPS x = Pσ,τ ′(x) and y := g
∗ < 1, it follows that g∗ ≤ q∗σ,τ ′ ≤
suppi∈Ψ1 q
∗
pi,τ ′ = q
∗
∗,τ ′ .
We now present the algorithm. First, as a preprocessing step, we apply the algorithm of Figure
1, which identifies in P-time all the variables xi where g
∗
i = 1. We then remove these variables
from the system, substituting the value 1 in their place. We then simplify and reduce the resulting
SNF-form minimax-PPS into a reduced form, with GFP g∗ < 1. Note that the resulting reduced
SNF-form minimax-PPS may contain some variables xj of form M, whose corresponding matrix
Aj(x) has some entries that contain the value 1 rather than a variable (because we substituted 1 for
removed variables xj , where g
∗
j = 1). Note also that in the reduced SNF-form minimax-PPS each
variable xi of form Q has an associated quadratic equation xi = xjxk, because if one of the variables
(say xk) on the right-hand side was set to 1 during preprocessing, the resulting equation (xi = xj)
would have been declared to have form L in the reduced minimax-PPS. We henceforth assume that
the minimax-PPS is in SNF-form, with g∗ < 1, and we let X be its set of (remaining) variables.
We apply now the algorithm of Figure 2 to the minimax-PPS with g∗ < 1, which identifies the
variables xi in the minimax-PPS (equivalently, the types in the BCSG), from which we can almost-
surely reach the target type Tf∗ (i.e., g
∗
i = 0 and there is a strategy τ
∗ for the player minimizing
non-reachability probability that achieves this value, no matter what the other player does).
Theorem 5.5. Given a BCSG with minimax-PPS, x = P (x), such that the GFP g∗ < 1, the
algorithm in Figure 2 terminates in polynomial time and returns the following set of variables:
{xi ∈ X | ∃τ ∈ Ψ2 (g∗∗,τ )i = 0}.
Proof. First, let us provide some notation and terminology for analyzing the algorithm. The integer
t ≥ 1 represents the number of iterations of the main loop of the algorithm, i.e., the number of
executions of steps 2 through 7 (inclusive; note that some of these steps are themselves loops).
Let St denote the set S inside iteration t of the algorithm and just before we reach step 3 of the
algorithm (in other words, just after the loop in step 2 has finished). Similarly, let Ft denote the
set F just before step 6 in iteration t of the algorithm. We also define a new set, Kt, which doesn’t
appear explicitly in the algorithm. Let Kt := X − (St ∪ Ft), for every iteration t ≥ 1. The set γit
in the algorithm denotes a set of moves/actions of the min player at variable xi (i.e. type Ti).
4
We now start the proof of correctness for the algorithm. Clearly, the algorithm terminates, i.e.,
step 6 eventually gets executed. This is because (due to step 7.) each extra iteration of the main
loop must add at least one variable to the set S ⊆ X, and variables are never removed from the
set S. It also follows easily that the algorithm runs in P-time, since the main loop executes for
at most |X| iterations, and during each such iteration, each nested loop within it also executes
4We shall show that γit , for t ≥ 1, is a set of actions such that if the minimizer’s strategy only chooses a distribution
on actions contained in γit , for each variable xi, then starting at any variable xj ∈ X − St, the play will always stay
out of St.
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1. Initialize S := {xi ∈ X | Pi(0) > 0, that is Pi(x) has a constant term }.
Let γi0 := Γ
i
min for every variable xi ∈ X − S. Let t := 1.
2. Repeat until no change has occurred to S:
(a) if there is a variable xi ∈ X − S of form L where Pi(x) contains a variable already in S,
then add xi to S.
(b) if there is a variable xi ∈ X − S of form Q where both variables in Pi(x) are already in
S, then add xi to S.
(c) if there is a variable xi ∈ X − S of form M and if for all amin ∈ Γimin, there exists a
amax ∈ Γimax such that Ai(x)(amax,amin) ∈ S ∪ {1}, then add xi to S.
3. For each xi ∈ X − S of form M, let:
γit := {amin ∈ γit−1 | ∀amax ∈ Γimax, Ai(x)(amax,amin) 6∈ S ∪ {1}}. (Note that γit ⊆ γit−1.)
4. Let F := {xi ∈ X − S | Pi(1) < 1, or Pi(x) is of form Q }
5. Repeat until no change has occurred to F :
(a) if there is a variable xi ∈ X − (S ∪F ) of form L where Pi(x) contains a variable already
in F , then add xi to F .
(b) if there is a variable xi ∈ X − (S ∪ F ) of form M such that for ∀amax ∈ Γimax, there is a
min player’s action amin ∈ γit such that Ai(x)(amax,amin) ∈ F , then add xi to F .
6. If X = S ∪ F , return F , and halt.
7. Else, let S := X − F , t := t+ 1, and go to step 2.
Figure 2: P-time algorithm for computing almost-sure reachability types {xi | ∃τ ∈ Ψ2 (g∗∗,τ )i = 0}
for a minimax-PPS (in SNF), associated with a given BCSG.
at most |X| iterations. So, the proof of correctness requires us to show that when the algorithm
halts, the set F is indeed the winning set for the minimizer (i.e., the player that aims to minimize
the non-reachability probability). That is, we need to show that for all xi ∈ F there exists a
(not-necessarily static) strategy τ for the minimizing player such that (g∗∗,τ )i = 0, i.e., regardless
of what strategy σ the maximizer plays again τ the probability of not reaching the target is 0. On
the other hand, if xi ∈ S, we need to show that there is no such strategy τ for the minimizer that
forces (g∗∗,τ )i = 0. In fact, we will show that for all xi ∈ S the following stronger property (∗∗)i
holds:
(∗∗)i: There is a strategy σ for the maximizing player, such that for any strategy τ of the minimizing
player (g∗σ,τ )i > 0; in other words, starting with one object of type Ti, using strategy pair σ
and τ , there is a positive probability of never reaching the target type.
Note that property (∗∗)i does not rule out that g∗i = 0, because even if (∗∗)i holds it is possible
that infτ∈Ψ2(g∗σ,τ )i = 0.
First, let us show that if variable xi ∈ S when the algorithm terminates, then (∗∗)i holds. To
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show this, we use induction on the “time” when a variables is added to S. That is, if all variables xj
added to S in previous steps and previous iterations satisfy (∗∗)j , then if a new variable xi is added
to S, it must also satisfy (∗∗)i. In the process of proving this, we shall in fact construct a single
non-static randomized strategy σ for the max player that ensures that for all xi ∈ S, regardless
what strategy τ the min player plays against σ, the probability of not reaching the target starting
at one object of type Ti is positive.
Consider the initial set S of variables {xi ∈ X | Pi(0) > 0} that S is initialized to in Step (1.) of
the algorithm. Clearly all these variables satisfy g∗i ≥ Pi(0) > 0. Thus, for these variables assertion
(∗∗)i holds using any strategy σ for the maximizer. Next consider a variable xi added to S inside
the loop in step (2.) of the algorithm, during some iteration.
(i) If xi = Pi(x) is of form L, then Pi(x) contains a variable xj (with a positive coefficient), that
was added previously to S, and hence (∗∗)j holds. Thus there is a positive probability that
one object of type Ti will produce one object of type Tj in the next generation. It thus follows
that (∗∗)i holds, by using the same strategy σ ∈ Ψ1 that witnesses the fact that (∗∗)j holds.
(ii) If xi = Pi(x) is of form Q (i.e., xi = xj · xr), then Pi(x) has both variables already added to
S, i.e., (∗∗)j and (∗∗)r both hold. Then (∗∗)i also holds, because starting from any object
of type Ti, the next generation necessarily contains one object of type Tj and one object of
type Tr, and thus by combining the two witness strategies for (∗∗)j and (∗∗)r, we have a
strategy σ ∈ Ψ1 that, starting from one object of type Ti, will ensure positive probability of
not reaching the target, regardless of the strategy τ ∈ Ψ2 of the minimizer.
(iii) If xi = Pi(x) is of form M, then ∀amin ∈ Γimin, ∃amax ∈ Γimax such that Ai(x)(amax,amin) ∈
S ∪ {1}. In this case, let us define the strategy σ to behave as follows at any object of type
Ti: for each amin ∈ Γimin, we designate one “witness” amax[amin] ∈ Γimax, which witnesses
that Ai(x)(amax[amin],amin) ∈ S ∪ {1}. Then, at any object of type Ti, σ chooses uniformly at
random among the witnesses amax[amin] for all amin ∈ Γimin. So, starting with one object
of type Ti, no matter what strategy the min player chooses, there is a positive probability
that in the next step that object will either not produce any offspring (in the case where
Ai(x)(amax[amin],amin) = 1) and hence not reach the target, or else will generate a single
successor object of type T(amax[min],amin), associated with variable x(amax[min],amin) that already
belongs to S, and hence such that (∗∗)j holds. Hence, by combining with the strategies that
witness such (∗∗)j with the local (static) behavior of σ described for any object of type Ti,
we obtain a strategy σ that witnesses the fact that (∗∗)i holds.
Now consider any variable xi that is added to S in step (7.) of some iteration t, in other words
any variable xi ∈ Kt. Since all variables in Kt were not added to St or Ft during iteration t, we
must have that: (A.) xi satisfies Pi(1) = 1 and Pi(0) = 0; (B.) xi is not of Q type; (C.) if xi is of
form L, then it depends directly only on variables in Kt; and (D.) if xi is of form M, then
∃amax ∈ Γimax such that ∀amin ∈ γit , Ai(x)(amax,amin) 6∈ (Ft ∪ St ∪ {1}). (2)
Let (qh)
∞
h=0, h ∈ N be the infinite sequence of increasing probabilities defined by: qh = 2−(1/2
h).
Note that as h→∞, the probability qh approaches 1 from below.
Given a finite history H of height h (meaning the depth of the forest that the history represents
is h), for any object e in the current generation (the leaves) of H, if the object e has type Ti such
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that the associated variable xi ∈ Kt, we shall construct the strategy σ to behave as follows starting
at the object e. The strategy σ will choose one action amax that “witnesses” the statement (2)
above, and will place probability qh on that action, and it will distribute the remaining probability
1 − qh uniformly among all actions in Γimax. We claim that this strategy σ ensures that for any
object e of type Ti such that xi ∈ Kt, irrespective of the strategy of the minimizing player, the
probability of not reaching the target type Tf∗ starting with e (at any point in history) is positive.
This clearly implies that (g∗σ,∗)Kt > 0. To prove this, there are two cases here:
1. First, suppose that during the entire play of the game, at all objects e whose type Ti such that
xi ∈ Kt has form M , the min player only uses actions belonging to γit . Then in the resulting
history of play there can not be any such object e whose child in the history (a necessarily
unique child, since e has type M) is an object e′ of a type in St (this is because step (3.) of
the algorithm, which defines γit , ensures that actions for the min player in γ
i
t can not possibly
produce a child in St, no matter what the max player does). Furthermore, such an object e,
occurring at depth h in history, must with positive probability ≥ qh, produce a child e′ with
a type in Kt (because of point (D.) above, and because of the fact that the max player plays
at e a witness amax to the statement (2) with probability ≥ qh).
So consider an object e of some type in Kt, that occurs in a history H at height h ≥ 0, and
consider the tree of descendants of e. What is the probability, under the strategy σ, and
under any strategy τ for the min player whose moves are confined to the sets specified by γt,
that the “tree” of descendants of e is just a “line” consisting of an infinite sequence of objects
e0 = e, e1, e2, . . ., all of which have types contained in Kt? This probability is clearly
∞∏
d=h
qd =
∞∏
d=h
2−(1/2
d) ≥
∞∏
d=0
2−(1/2
d) = 2−
∑∞
d=0(1/2
d) = 2−2 =
1
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That is, irrespective of what strategy τ is played by the minimizer, there is positive probability
bounded away from 0 (indeed, ≥ 1/4) of staying forever confined in objects having types in
Kt. In such a case, clearly, there will be positive probability of not reaching the target type
(since the types in Kt are not the target type).
2. Next suppose that, on the other hand, there is a history H of some height h and a leaf e of H
that has type Ti where xi ∈ Kt, such that the min player’s strategy τ plays at object e some
action(s) outside of the set γit with positive probability. Note that for all actions a
′
min 6∈ γit ,
there is a max player’s action amax ∈ Γimax such that Ai(x)(amax,a′min) ∈ St ∪ {1}. Note
moreover that the strategy σ assigns positive probability, at least (1 − qh)/|Γimax| to every
action in Γimax. Thus, if the min player’s strategy τ puts positive probability τ(H, e, amin) > 0
on some action amin 6∈ γti , then with probability ≥
(
maxamin 6∈γit τ(H, e, amin)
) · (1−qh)|Γimax| , either
the object e will have no child (since we can have Ai(x)(amax,amin) = 1), or the only child of
object e in the history will be an object e′ whose type is in the set St, from which we already
know that the target type Tf∗ is not reached with positive probability. So in either case, with
positive probability the target type T ∗f∗ will not be reached from descendants of e.
Now, let us assume the max player uses this strategy σ, and suppose we start play at one object
e′ of type Ti such that xi ∈ Kt. Suppose, first, that during the entire history of play the min
player’s strategy τ uses only actions in γit for all variables xi ∈ Kt of form M. In this case, with
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positive probability bounded away from 0 (in fact ≥ 1/4), the play tree after k rounds (i.e., depth
k), for any positive k ≥ 1, consists of simply a linear sequence of objects having types in Kt. Thus
in this case, with probability ≥ 1/4, the play will forever stay in Kt, and will never reach target
type Tf∗ . On the other hand, suppose the min player’s strategy τ does at some point in some
history consisting entirely of a linear sequence of objects of types in Kt, namely at some specific
object e of type Kt at depth h, plays an action outside of γ
i
t with positive probability. Then σ
ensures that with positive probability (albeit a probability depending on h and thus not bounded
away from 0) either e will have no child or the unique child of e will be an object of type Tj such
that xj ∈ St, i.e., there is a positive probability of not reaching the target Tf∗ from the descendants
of e, and thus also from the start of the game (because we assumed the play staring from e′ and up
to e consists of a linear sequence of objects all having types in Kt). Thus, for all strategies τ ∈ Ψ2,
and all xi ∈ Kt, (g∗σ,τ )i > 0. Note however, that in general it may be the case that infτ (g∗σ,τ )i = 0,
because in the case when τ does play outside of γit , the probability of not hitting the target type is
not bounded away from 0 (it depends both on the depth h at which τ first moves outside of γit with
positive probability, and it also depends on the probability of that move, and for both reasons it
can be arbitrarily close to 0). This establishes the first part of the proof, i.e., that for every xi ∈ S
the property (∗∗)i holds.
Now we proceed to the second part of the proof. Suppose F is the set of variables output by the
algorithm when it halts (and that therefore S = X − F ). Suppose the algorithm executed exactly
t∗ iterations of the main loop before halting (so that the value of t just before halting is t∗). We
will show that there is a (randomized non-static) strategy τ of the minimizing player such that, for
all xi ∈ F , regardless what strategy σ the maximizer employs, starting with on object of type Ti,
the probability of not reaching the target type is 0. In other words, that (g∗∗,τ )i = 0, which is what
we want to prove.
Before describing τ , we first describe a static randomized strategy (i.e., a policy) τ∗ for the
minimizing player, that will eventually lead us toward a definition of τ .
Specifically, we define the policy (randomized static strategy) τ∗ as follows. Let τ ′ be any LDF
policy such that g∗∗,τ ′ < 1. Such an LDF policy τ
′ must exist, by Lemma 5.4(1.). For all variables
xi ∈ S, let τ∗(xi) := τ ′(xi). In other words, at all variables xi ∈ S, let τ∗ behave according to the
exact same distribution on actions as the LDF policy τ ′. For every variable xi ∈ F of form M, define
τ∗ as follows: note that xi must have entered F in some iteration of the inner loop in step (5.)(b) of
the algorithm, during the final iteration t∗ of the main loop. Therefore, for all amax ∈ Γimax, there
exists a “witness” action amin[amax] ∈ γit∗ such that the associated variable Ai(x)(amax,amin[amax])
was already in F , before xi was added to F . For xi ∈ F we define the policy τ∗ at variable xi, i.e.,
the distribution τ∗(xi), to be the uniform distribution over the set {amin[amax] ∈ γit∗ | amax ∈ Γimax}
of such “witnesses”.
We now wish to show that τ∗, as defined, is itself an LDF policy. Consider any fixed policy (i.e.,
static randomized strategy) σ for the max player, and consider the resulting system of polynomial
equations x = Pσ,τ∗(x). For every variable xi ∈ F , consider the variables xi depends on directly in
the equation xi = (Pσ,τ∗(x))i. Let’s consider separately the cases, based on the form of equation
xi = Pi(x): (1) if xi = Pi(x) is of form L, then in xi = (Pσ,τ∗(x))i the variable xi depends directly
only on variables in F , because otherwise it would have been added to set S; (2) if xi is of form M,
then again it depends directly only on variables in F , because τ∗(xi) only puts positive probability
on actions in γit∗ ; (3) if xi is of form Q, then xi depends directly on at least one variable in F ,
because otherwise it would have been added to S. This implies that, in the dependency graph of
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x = Pσ,τ∗(x), every variable in F satisfies one of the three conditions in Lemma 5.1(ii) (namely,
1. or 3.). So for every variable xi ∈ X, consider paths in the dependency graph of x = Pσ,τ∗(x)
starting at xi:
• either there exists a path from xi in this dependency graph to variable xj ∈ F , which in
turn must have a path to a variable xj′ such that either Pj′(1) < 1, or xj′ has form Q. In
either case, this means that xi satisfies one of the conditions of Lemma 5.1(ii) (namely, either
condition (1.) or condition (3.)); Or
• all paths from xi only contain variables in S. But for all variables xk ∈ S, τ∗(xk) is exactly
the same distribution as τ ′(xk), and since the LDF policy τ ′ was chosen so that g∗∗,τ ′ < 1,
this means that there is a path from xi to a variable xj satisfying one of the three conditions
in Lemma 5.1(ii) (specifically, condition (3.)).
Therefore, x = Pσ,τ∗(x) is a LDF-PPS. But since the fixed strategy σ was arbitrary, this implies
that τ∗ is indeed an LDF policy. Since τ∗ is LDF, by Lemma 5.4(2.), it holds that g∗ ≤ q∗∗,τ∗ .
We now construct a non-static strategy τ , which combines the behavior of the two policies (i.e.,
two static strategies) τ ′ and τ∗ in a suitable way, such that for all xi ∈ F , (g∗∗,τ )i = 0. In other
words, τ will be a strategy for the minimizer such that, no matter what strategy σ the maximizer
uses starting with one object of type Ti, the probability of not reaching the target type is 0.
The non-static strategy τ is defined as follows. The strategy τ will, in each generation, declare
one object in the current generation to be the “queen” (and this object will always have a type in
F ). Other objects in each generation will be “workers”. Assume play starts at a single object e
of some type Ti such that xi ∈ F . We declare this object the “queen” in the initial population.
If the queen e has associated variable xi of form M , then τ plays at e according to distribution
τ∗(xi). This results, (with probability 1), regardless of the strategy of the maximizer, in some
successor object e′ in the next generation of type Tj such that xj ∈ F . In this case, we declare
e′ the queen in the next generation, and we apply the same strategy τ starting at the queen e′ of
the next generation, as if the game is starting at this single object e′ of type Tj . If the variable xi
associated with the queen e is of form L, then in the next generation either we hit the target (with
probability (1−Pi(1)), or (with probability Pi(1)) we generate a single successor object e′ of some
type Tj such that xj ∈ F . In this latter case again, we declare e′ the queen of the next generation,
and we use the same strategy τ that is being defined, and apply it to e′ as if the game is starting
with the single object e′. If the queen e has associated variable xi of form Q, then in the next
generation there are two successor objects, e′ and e′′ of types Tj and Tk respectively (these may be
the same type), such that either xj ∈ F or xk ∈ F , or both are in F . In this case, we choose one of
the two successors whose type is in F , say wlog that this is e′, and we declare e′ the queen of the
next generation, we proceed from e′ using the same strategy τ that is being defined, as if the game
starts with the single object e′. However, we declare the other object e′′ a “worker”, and starting
with e′′ and thereafter (in the entire subtree of play rooted at e′′) we use the static strategy (i.e.,
the LDF policy) τ ′. This completes the definition of the non-static strategy τ .
We now show that indeed τ satisfies that, no matter what strategy σ the maximizer uses against
it, for any xi ∈ F , starting with one object of type Ti, the probability of not reaching the target
type is 0. In other words, we show that using τ the probability of reaching the target type is 1, no
matter what the opponent does.
To see this, first note that the LDF policy τ ′ was chosen so that g∗∗,τ ′ < 1. Thus, since in
the resulting max-PPS x = P∗,τ ′(x) the player maximizing non-reachability probability always
has a static optimal strategy (by Theorem 3.1), it follows that the subtree of the play rooted at
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any “worker” object e′′ starting at which strategy τ ′ is applied by the min player, has positive
probability (1− g∗∗,τ ′)i > 0 of eventually reaching the target type.
Next note that the sequence of queens is finite if and only if we have hit the target. Next, we
establish that if the sequence of queens is infinite, then, with probability 1, infinitely often the queen
is of type Q and thus in the next generation it generates both a queen and a worker. Thus, because
of the infinite sequence of workers generated by queens, there will be infinitely many independent
chances of hitting the target with probability at least mini(1− g∗∗,τ ′)i. Hence, we will hit the target
(somewhere in the entire tree of play) with probability 1.
It remains to show that, if the sequence of queens is infinite, then, with probability 1, infinitely
often a queen is of type Q. We in fact claim that with positive probability bounded away from 0,
in the next n = |X| generations either we reach a queen of type Q, or the queen has the target as
a child. To see this, we note that each type xi ∈ F has entered F in some iteration of the loop in
step (5.) of the algorithm (in the last iteration of the main loop). We can thus define inductively,
for each variable xi ∈ F , a finite tree Ri, rooted at xi, which shows “why” xi was added to F .
Specifically, if Pi(1) < 1 or xi has form Q, then Ri consists of just a single node (leaf) labeled by
xi. If xi has form L, then it was added in step (5.) because Pi(x) has a variable xj that was already
in F . In this case, the tree Ri has an edge from the root, labeled by xi to a single child labeled by
xj , such that this child is the root of a subtree Rj . If xi has form M then Ri has a root labeled by
xi and has children labeled by all variables x(amax,amin[amax]) ∈ F , and have R((amax,amin[amax]) as a
subtree, where amax ∈ Γimax and where amin[amax] ∈ γit∗ is the “witness” for amax, in the condition
that allows step 5.(b) of the algorithm to add xi to F .
Clearly the tree Ri is finite and has depth at most n (since there are only n variables, and there
is a strict order in which the variables entered the set F ).
Now we argue that starting at a queen of type Ti, using strategy τ for the minimizing player,
with positive probability bounded away from 0 in the next n steps the sequence of queens will
follow a root-to-leaf path in Ri, regardless of the strategy of the max player. To see this, note
that if a node is labeled by xj is of form L, then the play will in the next step, with probability
associated with the transition in the BCSG move to the unique child (the new queen) xj′ that is
the immediate child of the root in Rj , and thus next will be at the root of the subtree Rj′ . If the
node is labeled by xj of form M , then irrespective of the distribution on actions played by the max
player, in the next step with positive probability bounded away from 0, we will move to a child
xamax,amin[amax] ∈ F which is a child of the root in Rj , itself rooted at a subtree R(amax,amin[amax]),
because at queen objects we are using τ∗ for the minimizer. Thus, starting at a queen xi, with
positive probability bounded away from 0, within n steps the play arrives a leaf of the tree Ri. If
the leaf corresponds to a variable xj with Pj(1) < 1, then the process will reach in the next step
the target type with positive probability bounded away from 0. If, on the other hand, the leaf
corresponds to a variable xj of form Q, then the queen generates two children. The probability
that the queen reaches infinitely often a leaf of type L with Pj(1) < 1 but does not reach the target
is 0. Thus, if the queen never reaches the target throughout the play, then the queen will generate
more than one child infinitely often with probability 1, and hence will generate infinitely many
independent workers with probability 1. By the choice of the policy τ ′ followed by workers, the
subtree rooted at each worker will hit the target with positive probability bounded away from 0.
Hence, the probability of hitting the target type is 1. This completes the proof of the theorem.
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Corollary 5.6. Let F be the set of variables output by the algorithm in Figure 2.
1. Let S = X − F . There is a randomized non-static strategy σ for the max player (maximizing
non-reachability) such that for all xi ∈ S, and for all strategies τ of the min player (minimizing
non-reachability), starting with one object of type Ti, the probability of reaching the target type
is < 1.
2. There is a randomized non-static strategy τ for the min player (minimizing non-reachability),
such that for all strategies σ of the max player (maximizing non-reachability), and for all
xi ∈ F , starting at one object of type Ti the probability of reaching the target type is 1.
Proof. 1. The strategy σ constructed in the proof of Theorem 5.5 for variables xi ∈ S achieves
precisely this.
2. The strategy τ constructed in the proof of Theorem 5.5 for all variables xi ∈ F achieves
precisely this.
Remark: Neither the strategy σ from Corollary 1, nor the strategy τ from 2, both of which were
constructed in the proof of Theorem 5.5, are static strategies. However, we note that both of these
non-static randomized strategies have suitable compact descriptions (as functions that map finite
histories to distributions over actions for objects in the current populations), and that both these
strategies can be constructed and described compactly in polynomial time, as a function of the
encoding size of the input BCSG.5
6 P-time algorithm for limit-sure reachability for BCSGs
In this section, we focus on the qualitative limit-sure reachability problem, i.e., starting with one
object of a type Ti, decide whether the reachability value is 1. Recall that there may not exist
an optimal strategy for the player aiming to reach the target Tf∗ , which was the question in the
previous section (almost-sure reachability). However, there may nevertheless be a sequence of
strategies that achieve values arbitrarily close to 1 (limit sure reachability), and the question of
the existence of such a sequence is what we address in this section. Since we translate reachability
into non-reachability when analysing the corresponding minimax-PPS, we are asking whether there
exists a sequence of strategies 〈τ∗j | j ∈ N〉 for the min player, such that ∀j ∈ N, j > j+1 > 0, and
where limj→∞ j = 0, such that the strategy τ∗j forces non-reachability probability to be at most
j , regardless of the strategy σ used by the max player. In other words, for a given starting object
of type Ti, we ask whether infτ∈Ψ2(g∗∗,τ )i = 0.
Again, as in the almost-sure case, we first, as a preprocessing step, use the P-time algorithm
from Proposition 4.1 to remove all variables xi such that g
∗
i = 1, and we substitute 1 for these
variables in the remaining equations. We hence obtain a reduced SNF-form minimax-PPS, for
which we can assume g∗ < 1. The set of all remaining variables in the SNF-form minimax-PPS is
again denoted by X. Thereafter, we apply the algorithm in Figure 3, which computes the set of
variables, xi, such that g
∗
i = 0. In other words, we compute the set of types, such that starting from
one object of that type the value of the reachability game is 1. Before considering the algorithm in
5However, it is worth pointing out that the functions that these strategies compute, i.e., functions from histories
to distributions, need not themselves be polynomial-time as a function of the encoding size of the history: this is
because the probabilities on actions that are involved can be double-exponentially small (and double-exponentially
close to 1), as a function of the size of the history.
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1. Initialize S := {xi ∈ X | Pi(0) > 0, that is Pi(x) has a constant term }.
2. Repeat until no change has occurred to S:
(a) if there is a variable xi ∈ X − S of form L where Pi(x) contains a variable already in S,
then add xi to S.
(b) if there is a variable xi ∈ X − S of form Q where both variables in Pi(x) are already in
S, then add xi to S.
(c) if there is a variable xi ∈ X − S of form M and if for all amin ∈ Γimin, there exists
amax ∈ Γimax such that Ai(x)(amax,amin) ∈ S ∪ {1}, then add xi to S.
3. Let F := {xi ∈ X − S | Pi(1) < 1, or Pi(x) is of form Q }
4. Repeat until no change has occurred to F :
(a) if there is a variable xi ∈ X − (S ∪F ) of form L where Pi(x) contains a variable already
in F , then add xi to F .
(b) if there is a variable xi ∈ X − (S ∪ F ) of form M and if the following procedure returns
“Yes”, then add xi to F .
i. Set L0 := ∅, B0 := ∅, k := 0. Let O := X − (S ∪ F ).
ii. Repeat:
• k := k + 1.
• Lk := {amin ∈ Γimin−
⋃k−1
j=0 Lj | ∀amax ∈ Γimax−Bk−1, Ai(x)(amax,amin) ∈ F∪O}.
• Bk := Bk−1 ∪ {amax ∈ Γimax −Bk−1 | ∃amin ∈ Lk s.t. Ai(x)(amax,amin) ∈ F}.
Until Bk = Bk−1.
iii. Return: “Yes” if Bk = Γ
i
max, and “No” otherwise.
5. If X = S ∪ F , return F , and halt.
6. Else, let S := X − F , and go to step 2.
Figure 3: P-time algorithm for computing the types that satisfy limit-sure reachability in a given
BCSG, i.e., the set of variables {xi | g∗i = 0} in the associated minimax-PPS.
Figure 3 in detail, we provide some preliminary results that will be used to prove its correctness.
More precisely, we first examine the nested loop in step 4.(b) of the algorithm. This inner loop is
derived directly from a closely related “limit-escape” construction used by de Alfaro, Henzinger,
and Kupferman in [1]. For completeness, we provide proofs here for the facts we need about this
construction.
For a variable xi of form M, for 1-step local strategies σ(xi) and τ(xi) at xi for the two players
(i.e., σ(xi) and τ(xi) are distributions on Γ
i
max and Γ
i
min, respectively), and for a set W ⊆ X ∪{1}
which can include both variables and possibly also the constant 1, let us define:
p(xi →W,σ(xi), τ(xi)) =
∑
{(amax,amin)∈Γimax×Γimin|Ai(x)(amax,amin)∈W}
σ(xi)(amax) · τ(xi)(amin)
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Thus p(xi →W,σ(xi), τ(xi)) denotes the probability that, starting with one object of type Ti, and
using the 1-step strategies specified by σ(xi) and τ(xi), we will either generate a child object of
type Tj such that xj ∈ W , or (only if 1 ∈ W ) generate no child object (i.e., go extinct in the next
generation).
Assume that in step 4.(b) for a variable xi the loop stops at some iteration m (i.e., Bm−1 = Bm),
but Bm
⊂
6= Γimax, and hence step 4.(b) answers “No”, and xi is not added to F . In such a case,
let us define the following 1-step strategy, σ(xi) for the max player which will be used in the next
lemma. Let Dimax := Γ
i
max −Bm. Let
σ(xi)(amax) :=

1
|Dimax|
for every amax ∈ Dimax
0 otherwise
(3)
Lemma 6.1. Suppose that for a variable xi ∈ X−(S∪F ) the answer in step 4.(b) of the algorithm
is “No”, and let σ(xi) be defined as in (3). Then, there is a constant ci > 0 such that for every
local 1-step strategy τ(xi) for the min player at xi, the following inequality holds:
p(xi → S ∪ {1}, σ(xi), τ(xi)) ≥ ci ∗ p(xi → (F ∪ S ∪ {1}), σ(xi), τ(xi))
Proof. Suppose the loop from step 4.(b) stops at iteration m, such that Bm−1 = Bm ⊂ Γimax. There
are two possibilities:
1. Lm = ∅: That is, for every amin ∈ Γimin−
⋃m−1
q=0 Lq, there exists amax ∈ Dimax = Γimax−Bm−1
such that Ai(x)(amax,amin) ∈ S ∪ {1}. Let τ(xi) be an arbitrary 1-step strategy for the min
player and let σ(xi) be as defined in 3. Also let D
i
min := Γ
i
min −
⋃m−1
q=0 Lq. Then it follows
that:
p(xi → S ∪ {1}, σ(xi), τ(xi)) ≥
∑
amin∈Dimin
1
|Dimax|
τ(xi)(amin) =
1
|Dimax|
∑
amin∈Dimin
τ(xi)(amin)
(4)
Note that, by construction, for all amax ∈ Dimax and amin ∈
⋃m−1
q=0 Lq, Ai(x)(amax,amin) ∈ O.
Hence, since the support of distribution σ(xi) is D
i
max, and since D
i
min = Γ
i
min −
⋃m−1
q=0 Lq,
we have
p(xi → (F ∪ S ∪ {1}), σ(xi), τ(xi)) ≤
∑
amin∈Dimin
τ(xi)(amin) (5)
Combining these bounds, we get:
p(xi → S ∪ {1}, σ(xi), τ(xi)) ≥ 1|Dimax|
∑
amin∈Dimin
τ(xi)(amin)
≥ 1|Dimax|
p(xi → (F ∪ S ∪ {1}), σ(xi), τ(xi))
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2. Lm 6= ∅, but {amax ∈ Dimax | ∃amin ∈ Lm s.t. Ai(x)(amax,amin) ∈ F} = ∅. Therefore for all
amax ∈ Dimax, and for all amin ∈ Lm, Ai(x)(amax,amin) ∈ O. Let τ(xi) be any 1-step strategy
for the min player, and let σ(xi) be as defined in 3. Let D
i
min := Γ
i
min−
⋃m
q=0 Lq. Note that if
Dimin = ∅, then p(xi → S ∪{1}, σ(xi), τ(xi)) = 0 = p(xi → (F ∪S ∪{1}), σ(xi), τ(xi)). So, in
this case, the lemma holds for any constant c > 0. If Dimin 6= ∅, then both the inequalities (4)
and (5) hold again, with the minor modification that now we have Dimin = Γ
i
min −
⋃m
q=0 Lq
instead of Dimin := Γ
i
min −
⋃m−1
q=0 Lq.
Therefore, in both cases the lemma is satisfied with ci :=
1
|Dimax| =
1
|Γimax−Bm| .
We are now ready to prove correctness for the algorithm in Figure 3.
Theorem 6.2. Given a BCSG with minimax-PPS, x = P (x), with GFP g∗ < 1, the algorithm in
Figure 3 terminates in polynomial time, and returns the set of variables {xi ∈ X | g∗i = 0}.
Proof. The fact that the algorithm terminates and runs in polynomial time is again evident, as in
case of the almost-sure algorithm. (The only new fact to note is that the new inner loop in step
4.(b), can iterate at most maxi |Γimax| times because with each new iteration, k, at least one action
is added to the Bk−1, or else the algorithm halts.)
We need to show that when the algorithm terminates, for all xi ∈ F , g∗i = 0, and for all
xi ∈ S = X − F , g∗i > 0.
Let us first show that for all x ∈ S, g∗i > 0. In fact, we will show that there is a strategy σ ∈ Ψ1,
and a vector b > 0 of values, such that for all xi ∈ S, (g∗σ,∗)i ≥ bi > 0. For the base case, since any
variable xi contained in S at the initialization step has g
∗
i ≥ Pi(0) > 0, we have (g∗σ,∗)i > Pi(0) > 0
for any strategy σ, so let bi := Pi(0). For the inductive step, first consider any variable xi added
to S in step 2, in some iteration of the main loop of the algorithm.
(i) If xi = Pi(x) is of form L, then Pi(x) has a variable xj already in S, and by induction
(g∗σ,∗)j ≥ bj > 0. Since Pi(x) is linear, with a term qi,j · xj , such that qi,j > 0, we see that
(g∗σ,∗)i ≥ qij · bj > 0, so let bi := qij · bj .
(ii) If xi = Pi(x) is of form Q (i.e., xi = xj · xr), then Pi(x) has both variables previously added
to S, i.e., (g∗σ,∗)j ≥ bj > 0 and (g∗σ,∗)r ≥ br > 0. Then clearly (g∗σ,∗)i ≥ bj · br > 0. So let
bi := bj ∗ br.
(iii) If xi = Pi(x) is of form M, then ∀amin ∈ Γimin, ∃amax ∈ Γimax such that Ai(x)(amax,amin) ∈
S ∪ {1}. For each amin ∈ Γimin, let us use amax[amin] ∈ Γimax, to denote a “witness” to this
fact, i.e., such that Ai(x)(amax[amin],amin) ∈ S ∪ {1}. Let strategy σ do as follows: in any
object of type Ti corresponding to xi, σ selects uniformly at random an action from the set
{amax[amin] ∈ Γimax | amin ∈ Γimin} of all such witnesses. Clearly then, for any amin ∈ Γimin,
the probability that σ at an object of type Ti will choose the witness action amax[amin] is at
least 1|Γimax| (and in fact is also at least
1
|Γimin|
). So, using σ, starting with one object of type
Ti, no matter what strategy the min player chooses, there is a positive probability ≥ 1|Γimax|
that either the object will have no child or the object will generate a single child object of
type T(amax,amin), associated with variable xj = Ai(x)(amax,amin) ∈ S, and hence such that
(g∗σ,∗)j ≥ bj > 0. So no matter what strategy the min player picks, there is at least 1|Γimax|
probability that the unique child object belongs to S, or that there is no child object. Hence,
(g∗σ,∗)i ≥ 1|Γimax| ∗min{bj | xj ∈ S} > 0, and again we let bi :=
1
|Γimax| ∗min{bj | xj ∈ S}.
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Now consider any variable xi added to S in step 6 at some iteration of the algorithm (i.e.,
xi ∈ K := X − (S ∪ F )). Because xi was not previously added to S or F , then: (A.) xi satisfies
Pi(0) = 0 and Pi(1) = 1; (B.) xi is not of type Q; (C.) if xi is of form L, then it depends directly
only on variables in K; and (D.) if xi is of type M, then the answer for xi in step 4.(b) (during the
latest iteration of the main loop) was “No”.
For each xi ∈ K of type M , let σ(xi) be a probability distribution on actions in Γimax defined
in (3). Let strategy σ use the local 1-step strategy σ(xi) at every object of type Ti encountered
during history. We show that, for every xi ∈ K, (g∗σ,∗)i ≥ bi for some bi > 0.
By Lemma 6.1, for each variable xi ∈ K of type M, and for any arbitrary 1-step strategy τ(xi)
for the min player at xi, there exists ci > 0 such that:
p(xi → S ∪ {1}, σ(xi), τ(xi)) ≥ ci ∗ p(xi → (F ∪ S ∪ {1}), σ(xi), τ(xi))
For r ≥ 1, let Prσ,τxi (K U=r(S∪{1})) denote the probability that, starting with one object of type
Ti, where xi ∈ K, using strategy σ and an arbitrary (not necessarily static) strategy τ , the history
of play will stay in the set K for r − 1 rounds, and in the r’th will either transition to an object
whose type is in the set S, or will die (i.e., produce no children). Define Prσ,τxi (K U=r(F ∪S∪{1}))
similarly. The following claim is a simple corollary of Lemma 6.1. Let c := min{ci | xi ∈ K}. (Note
that 0 < c ≤ 1.)
Claim 6.3. For any integer r ≥ 1, and for any (not necessarily static) strategy τ for the min
player, Prσ,τxi (K U=r(S ∪ {1})) ≥ c ∗ Prσ,τxi (K U=r(F ∪ S ∪ {1})).
Proof. Let H(xi,K, r − 1) denote the set of all sequence of types in K of length r − 1, starting
with xi ∈ K. For a history (sequence) h ∈ H(xi,K, r− 1), let l(h) denote the index of the variable
associated with the last type in h, i.e., the one occurring at round r−1. For each h ∈ H(xi,K, r−1)
there is some probability qh ≥ 0 that, starting at xi ∈ K, the population follows the history h for
r − 1 rounds. So
Prσ,τxi (K U=r(S ∪ {1})) =
∑
h∈H(xi,K,r−1)
qh · p(xl(h) → S ∪ {1}, σ(h), τ(h))
≥
∑
h∈H(xi,K,r−1)
qh · cl(h) · p(xl(h) → (F ∪ S ∪ {1}), σ(h), τ(h)) (by Lemma 6.1)
≥ c ·
∑
h∈H(xi,K,r−1)
qh · p(xl(h) → (F ∪ S ∪ {1}), σ(h), τ(h))
= c · Prσ,τxi (K U=r(F ∪ S ∪ {1}))
We now argue that for all xi ∈ K, there exists bi > 0 such that for any strategy τ for the min
player, (g∗σ,τ )i > bi > 0.
Consider any strategy τ for the min player. For xi ∈ K, let Prσ,τxi (K) denote the probability
that the history stays forever in K, starting at one object of type Ti. Let Pr
σ,τ
xi (K U(S ∪ {1}))
denote the probability that the history stays in set K until it eventually either dies (has no children)
or transitions to an object with type in set S. Note that:
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(g∗σ,τ )i ≥ Prσ,τxi (K) + Prσ,τxi (K U(S ∪ {1})) ·min{(g∗σ,∗)j | xj ∈ S}
≥ Prσ,τxi (K) + Prσ,τxi (K U(S ∪ {1})) ·min{bj | xj ∈ S}
We will show that, regardless of the strategy τ for the min player, this probability must be at
least:
bi :=
c
2
·min{bj | xj ∈ S}
where c := min{ci | xi ∈ K}. Recall that 0 < c ≤ 1. Let p = Prσ,τxi (K). If p ≥ c2 , then we are
done, since the inequalities above imply (g∗σ,τ )i ≥ c2 ≥ bi. So, suppose p < c2 . Observe that:
Prσ,τxi (K U(S ∪ {1})) = Prσ,τxi ((K U(S ∪ {1})) ∩ ¬K)
= Prσ,τxi ((K U(S ∪ {1})) | ¬K) · Prσ,τxi (¬K)
= Prσ,τxi (K U(S ∪ {1}) | ¬K) · (1− p)
≥ Prσ,τxi (K U(S ∪ {1}) | ¬K) ·
1
2
.
So it only remains to show that Prσ,τxi (K U(S ∪ {1}) | ¬K) ≥ c. Note that the event ¬K is
equivalent to the event (K U(F ∪ S ∪ {1})). The event K U(S ∪ {1}) is equivalent to the disjoint
union
⋃∞
r=1K U=r(S ∪ {1}). Likewise for the event K U(F ∪ S ∪ {1}). Therefore:
Prσ,τxi (K U(S ∪ {1}) | ¬K) =
Prσ,τxi (K U(S ∪ {1}))
Prσ,τxi (¬K)
=
∑∞
r=1 Pr
σ,τ
xi (K U=r(S ∪ {1}))∑∞
r=1 Pr
σ,τ
xi (K U=r(F ∪ S ∪ {1}))
(6)
But by Claim 6.3, for all r ≥ 1, Prσ,τxi (K U=r(S ∪ {1})) ≥ c · Prσ,τxi (K U=r(F ∪ S ∪ {1})). Hence,
summing over all r, we have
∑∞
r=1 Pr
σ,τ
xi (K U=r(S ∪ {1})) ≥ c
∑∞
r=1 ·Prσ,τxi (K U=r(F ∪ S ∪ {1})).
Hence, dividing out and using (6), we have Prσ,τxi (K U(S ∪ {1}) | ¬K) ≥ c.
Thus, (g∗σ,τ )i ≥ bi, and since this holds for an arbitrary strategy τ for the min player, we have
(g∗σ,∗)i ≥ bi > 0.
We next want to show that if F is the set of variables output by the algorithm when it halts,
then for all variables xi ∈ F , g∗i = 0, or in other words, that the following holds:
∀ > 0, ∃τ ∈ Ψ2 s.t. ∀σ ∈ Ψ1, (g∗σ,τ)i ≤  (7)
Let N := maxi |Γimin|. Given some 0 ≤ e ≤ 12N , consider the following static distribution,
safe(xi, e), on actions for the min player at xi (i.e., distribution on Γ
i
min):
safe(xi, e)(amin) :=

(
e2
)j−1 · (1− e2)|Lj | if amin ∈ Lj , for some j ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1}(
e2
)k−1 · 1|Γimin −⋃k−1q=0 Lq| otherwise
(8)
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Given an  > 0, we define a (static) strategy τ as follows. If a variable xi of form M is in S,
then we let τ(xi) be the uniform distribution on the corresponding action set Γ
i
min. For variables
in F , we define τ as follows. Consider the last execution of the main loop of the algorithm. Let
F0 = {xi ∈ X − S | Pi(1) < 1, or Pi(x) is of form Q } be the set of variables assigned to F in
Step 3, and let xi1 , xi2 , . . . , xik∗ be the variables in F − F0 ordered according to the time at which
they were added to F in the iterations of Step 4. For each variable xit ∈ F of form M we let
τ(xit) = safe(xit , et) where the parameters et are set as follows. Let n be the number of variables,
and N := maxi |Γimin| the maximum number of actions of player min for any variable of form M. Let
κ be the minimum of (1) 1/N , (2) the minimum (nonnegative) coefficient of a monomial in Pi(x)
over all variables xi of form L, and (3) the minimum of 1 − Pi(1) over all xi of form L such that
Pi(1) < 1. Let λ = κ
n. Clearly, λ is a rational number that depends on the given minimax-PPS
x = P (x) (and the corresponding BCSG) and it has polynomial number of bits in the size of P .
Let d0 = dlog( nλ)e and let dt = d0 · (2N)t for t ≥ 1. We set et = 2−dt for all t ≥ 0. The numbers
et can be doubly exponentially small, but they can be represented compactly in floating point,
i.e., in polynomial size in the size of P and of . Note from the definitions that e0 ≤ λ/n, and
et = (et−1)2N for all t ≥ 1.
Consider the max-PPS x = P∗,τ(x) obtained from the given minimax-PPS x = P (x) by fixing
the strategy of the min player to τ. For every variable xi of form L or Q, the corresponding
equation xi = Pi(x) stays the same, and for every variable xi of form M the equation becomes
xi = maxamax∈Γimax
∑
amin∈Γimin τ(xi)(amin) · Ai(x)(amax,amin). Let f
∗ = g∗∗,τ be the greatest fixed
point of the max-PPS x = P∗,τ(x), and let M = max{f∗i |xi ∈ F}. We will show that M ≤ , i.e.,
f∗i ≤  for all xi ∈ F .
First, we show that all variables of X have value strictly less than 1 in f∗, and we also bound
the value of the variables of S in terms of M .
Claim 6.4.
(1) For all xi ∈ X, f∗i < 1.
(2) For all xi ∈ X, f∗i ≤ λM + (1− λ).
Proof. The algorithm of Proposition 4.1 (see Fig. 1) computes the set X of variables xi of the
minimax-PPS such that g∗i < 1 (this set is denoted S in Fig. 1, but to avoid confusion with the
set S of the limit-sure reachability algorithm of Fig. 3, we refer to it as X in the following). We
use induction on the time that a variable xi was added to X in the algorithm of Fig. 1 to show the
claim. For part (2), our induction hypothesis is that if a variable xi is added to X at time t (where
the initialization is time 1) then f∗i ≤ κtM + (1− κt). This inequality implies (2) since t ≤ n and
λ = κn.
For the basis case (t = 1), xi is a deficient variable, i.e. Pi(1) < 1, hence f
∗
i ≤ Pi(1) ≤ 1−κ < 1.
For the induction step, if xi is of form L or Q, then Pi(x) contains a variable xj that was added
earlier to X, hence f∗i < 1 follows from f
∗
j < 1 by the induction hypothesis. For part (2), if xi
is of form L, then the coefficient of xj in Pi(x) is at least κ and f
∗
j ≤ κt−1M + (1 − κt−1) by the
induction hypothesis, hence f∗i ≤ κ(κt−1M + (1− κt−1)) + 1− κ = κtM + (1− κt). If xi is of form
Q, then f∗i ≤ f∗j ≤ κt−1M + (1− κt−1) ≤ κtM + (1− κt).
If xi is of form M then for every action amax ∈ Γimax, there exists an action amin ∈ Γimin such
that the variable xj = Ai(x)(amax,amin) was added previously to X, and hence its value in f
∗ is < 1
by the induction hypothesis. Since τ(xi) plays all the actions of Γ
i
min with nonzero probability,
both when xi ∈ S and when xi ∈ F , it follows that f∗i < 1. This shows part (1). For part (2), if
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xi ∈ F , then f∗i ≤ M ≤ κtM + (1 − κt), where the first inequality follows from the definition of
M . Suppose xi ∈ S and let amax be an action in Γimax that yields the greatest fixed point f∗i in
the max-PPS equation xi = (P∗,τ(x))i. The right-hand side for this action is a linear expression
that contains a variable xj = Ai(x)(amax,amin) that was added previously to X, and the coefficient
of this term is 1/|Γimin| ≥ 1/N ≥ κ, since τ(xi) is the uniform distribution for xi ∈ S. Therefore,
f∗i ≤ κf∗j + (1− κ) ≤ κ(κt−1M + (1− κt−1)) + 1− κ = κtM + (1− κt).
We can show the key lemma now.
Lemma 6.5. For all xi ∈ F , f∗i ≤ .
Proof. Recall that F = F0 ∪ {xi1 , xi2 , . . . , xik∗}. Let M0 = max{f∗i |xi ∈ F0} and let Mt = f∗it
for t ≥ 1 be the value of xit in the greatest fixed point f∗ of the max-PPS x = P∗,τ(x). Thus,
M = max{Mt|t ≥ 0}. Let rt = (et)2N−1. Note that for every xit ∈ F of form M, the probability
with which τ(xit) = safe(xit , et) plays any action in a set Lj is at least (e
2
t )
N−1(1− e2t )/N which
is > (et)
2N−1 = rt because et < 1/(2N). Let st = Πtj=1rj ; by convention, s0 = 1.
We will show first that for all t ≥ 0, there exist at, gt ≥ 0 that satisfy at ≥ λ·st and gt ≤ t·e0·at/λ,
and such that Mt ≤ atM2 + (1− at − gt)M + gt. We will use induction on t.
Basis: t = 0. Then M0 = f
∗
i for a variable xi ∈ F0 which is either a deficient variable of form
L or a variable of form Q. If xi is of form L, then note that (1) Pi does not contain a constant
term (because otherwise xi would have been added to set S in Step 1), (2) all the variables of Pi(x)
are not in S (because otherwise xi would have been added to set S in Step 2), hence they are all
eventually added to F and thus their value in f∗ is at most M , and (3) the coefficients sum to at
most 1 − κ because Pi(1) < 1. Therefore, M0 = f∗i ≤ (1 − κ)M ≤ λM2 + (1 − λ)M . If xi is of
form Q, at least one of the variables of Pi(x) must belong to F (because otherwise xi would have
been added to S in Step 2), hence its value in f∗ is at most M , and the value of the other variable
is at most λM + (1− λ) by Claim 6.4. Therefore, M0 = f∗i ≤M(λM + 1− λ) = λM2 + (1− λ)M .
Thus in both cases, M0 ≤ λM2 + (1− λ)M . We can take a0 = λ, g0 = 0.
Induction step: We have Mt = f
∗
it
. If xit is of form L, then Pit(x) contains a variable xj that
was added earlier to F ; its coefficient, say p, is at least κ. Note again that Pit(x) does not contain a
constant term, all the other variables of Pit(x) are not in S, hence they are all eventually added to F
and their value in f∗ is at most M , and the sum of their coefficients is 1−p. Since the variable xj was
added earlier to F , by the induction hypothesis we have f∗j ≤ auM2 + (1−au−gu)M +gu for some
u ≤ t−1. Therefore, Mt ≤ p(auM2 +(1−au−gu)M+gu)+(1−p)M = atM2 +(1−at−gt)M+gt,
with at = pau and gt = pgu. Since u ≤ t− 1, we have au ≥ λ · su ≥ λ · st−1, and since p ≥ κ ≥ rt it
follows that at = pau ≥ λ · st−1 · rt = λ · st. Also, gt = pgu ≤ pue0au/λ ≤ te0at/λ.
Suppose xit is of form M, and let amax ∈ Γitmax be an action of the max player that yields the
greatest fixed point f∗it in the max-PPS equation xit = (P∗,τ(x))it . Then amax belongs to some
Bj in Step 4 of the algorithm of Fig. 3, and thus there is a amin ∈ Lj such that the variable
Ait(x)(amax,amin) was added earlier to F , i.e., it is variable xiu for some u ≤ t − 1 or it belongs to
F0. The probability p = τ(xit)(amin) of this action in strategy τ is p = (e
2
t )
j−1 · (1− e2t )/|Lj |. All
the variables Ait(x)(amax,a) for a ∈ ∪jq=1Lq are not in S, hence they are all eventually assigned to
F . The total probability that strategy τ gives to the actions a ∈ ∪jq=1Lq is 1 − (e2t )j , hence the
remaining probability assigned to the other actions a ∈ Γitmin−∪jq=1Lq is (e2t )j which is ≤ pet since
et ≤ 1/(2N). Therefore, Mt ≤ pMu + (1 − p − pet)M + pet for some u ≤ t − 1. By the induction
hypothesis, Mu ≤ auM2 + (1 − au − gu)M + gu, where au ≥ λsu and gu ≤ ue0au/λ. Hence,
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Mt ≤ p(auM2 + (1− au − gu)M + gu) + (1− p− pet)M + pet = atM2 + (1− at − gt)M + gt, where
at = pau and gt = pgu + pet. Since p ≥ rt and au ≥ λsu ≥ λst−1, we have at ≥ λst. It is easy to
check from the definitions that et ≤ e0st−1. Indeed, log et = −d0(2N)t, while log(e0st−1) = log e0 +
(2N−1)∑t−1j=1 log ej = −d0((2N)t−2N+1). Since gu ≤ ue0au/λ and et ≤ e0st−1 ≤ e0su ≤ e0au/λ,
we have gt = pgu + pet ≤ p(u+ 1)e0au/λ ≤ te0at/λ.
Therefore, for all t we have Mt ≤ atM2 + (1− at− gt)M + gt, where at ≥ λst and gt ≤ te0at/λ.
Let t be an index with the maximum Mt, i.e., M = Mt. Then M ≤ atM2 + (1 − at − gt)M + gt,
hence atM
2 − (at + gt)M + gt ≥ 0. That is, (atM − gt)(M − 1) ≥ 0. From Claim 6.4, M < 1.
Therefore, atM ≤ gt. Thus, M ≤ gt/at ≤ te0/λ ≤ .
This concludes the proof of the theorem.
From the constructions in the proof of the theorem we have the following:
Corollary 6.6. Suppose the algorithm in Figure 3 outputs the set F when it terminates. Let
S := X − F .
1. There is a randomized static strategy σ for the max player (maximizing non-reachability) such
that for all variables xi ∈ S, we have (g∗σ,∗)i > 0.
2. For all  > 0, there is a randomized static strategy τ, for the min player (minimizing non-
reachability), such that for all variables xi ∈ F , (g∗∗,τ)i ≤ .
Proof. This follows directly from the strategies σ, and τ, constructed in the proof of Theorem
6.2.
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